Metonymy - a Figure of Speech or a Figure of the Mind

Abstract

In the classical theory, metonymy is defined as a figure of speech which mainly operates on names of things. According to more recent studies, however, metonymy is a particular type of mental mapping, a highly structured cognitive mechanism rather than a simple linguistic matter. The fact that metonymy is not merely a figure of speech seems to be now universally acknowledged and the evidence supporting this fact abounds in cognitive linguistic literature (e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Taylor 1995, Panther and Radden 1999). The main aim of this article is to put the evidence together and present it in an orderly fashion. The secondary aim, which appeared sort of by accident, is to shed light on the questionable division of metonymies into models of categories and models of individuals suggested by Lakoff (1987). The article is an introductory attempt at showing that metonymy is a multilevel phenomenon; a phenomenon which escapes the simple classification into models of categories or models of individuals. Due to certain limitations of space however, the secondary issue was not discussed in detail in the article