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dc.contributor.authorŁukasiewicz, Dariusz
dc.date.accessioned2014-05-05T12:04:30Z
dc.date.available2014-05-05T12:04:30Z
dc.date.issued2013
dc.identifier.citationStudies in East European Thought 2013, Vol. 65, No 1-2, pp. 53-63en_US
dc.identifier.issn1573-0948
dc.identifier.urihttp://repozytorium.ukw.edu.pl/handle/item/469
dc.description.abstractPrior to his ‘naturalistic turn’, Bocheński was a Thomist and defended the Thomist doctrine as a logically consistent and attractive philosophical system. Some opponents of Thomism interpreted this doctrine, Aquinas’s conception of divine providence included, as a kind of theological fatalism (or theological determinism) incompatible with human freedom. Bocheński dismissed such interpretations as based on “a superficial misunderstanding.” I will try to demonstrate that his criticism of deterministic interpretations of Thomism was not quite justified. The article will present, first, Bocheński’s account of the Thomist doctrine of divine providence, next, the arguments for theological fatalism leading to the conclusion that there is no freedom if Aquinas’s conception of divine nature is assumed. Finally, I will try to show how the dispute between Thomism and its opponents is rooted in some fundamental differences concerning the very concept of human freedom.en_US
dc.language.isoenen_US
dc.publisherSpringer Open
dc.publisher
dc.subjectJózef Maria Bocheńskien_US
dc.subjectBoethiusen_US
dc.subjectThomas Aquinasen_US
dc.subjectZagzebskien_US
dc.subjectCompatibilismen_US
dc.subjectDeterminismen_US
dc.subjectDivine providenceen_US
dc.subjectFreedom of human willen_US
dc.subjectTheological fatalismen_US
dc.titleBocheński on divine providence and human freedomen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US


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