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Józef M. Bocheński's Conception of Analytic Philosophy

Józef M. Bocheński distinguished four phases in his long philosophical career (Bocheński 1994: 309):

- 1) the neo-Thomist phase 1934-40);
- 2) the historical and logical phase (1945-55);
- 3) the sovietological phase (1955-67);
- 4) the systematic and analytical phase (1970-92).

Indeed, he considered only the fourth as typically analytical, although in the previous three phases the analytical approach was not completely absent. He had applied the analytical method both in the first neo-Thomist phase, together with the other members of Cracow Circle (Jan Salamucha, Jan Franciszek Drewnowski, Bolesław Sobociński), using the tools of mathematical logic in order to analyze issues of philosophical theology (the proofs for the existence of God, the problem of the immortality of the soul, the theory of analogy), as well as in the second phase when he conducted a pioneering investigation in the history of logic, the result of which was *Formale Logik*, a review of the history of logic from Aristotle to contemporary mathematical logic, and including logic in India as well. To a certain extent, Bocheński did make use of the analytical approach during his sovietological phase, when he undertook a comprehensive study of Marxist-Leninist (Soviet) philosophy, and founded the Institute of East European Studies (Ost-Europa-Institut). The methods of analysis that he applied to the study of ideological phenomena, became the foundation of Western philosophical sovietology. About this period he later wrote – in an analytical spirit – that: „Rubbish is rubbish, but the scholarly study of rubbish is not rubbish” (Bocheński 1994: 264).

In this article, I shall focus specifically on Bocheński's understanding of analytic philosophy. I want to examine how he defined analytic philosophy and how he

distinguished its basic methods, aims and tasks. I refer primarily to the text of the inaugural lecture: *Über die analytische Philosophie*, which he delivered in 1985 at the International Wittgenstein Symposium (Bocheński 1993a). Bocheński later read this paper in a slightly modified version at a meeting of the Polish Philosophical Society in 1987 – it was published in the Polish philosophical journal “Ruch Filozoficzny” in 1990 (Bocheński 1990). In this fundamental text he discusses the very conception, methods, aims and tasks of analytic philosophy. Its essential meaning lies in the presentation of a broad conception of analytic philosophy, understood as a specific methodological program. Furthermore, it is an interesting attempt to identify the main features of the practice of analytic philosophy and indicate its social role.

1. The definition of analytic philosophy

Bocheński understood analytic philosophy in a very broad manner, seeing its sources both in the ancient and medieval tradition of thought. He named Plato as the first analytic philosopher, giving as an example of the analysis the virtue of piety in the *Euthyphron*. However, in his opinion, the true models for the contemporary analytical philosophers are Aristotle and the Scholastics. Contemporary analytic philosophy adheres to all the best achievements of these old thinkers, especially where method is concerned.

Bocheński was aware that analytic philosophy is not a particular school of philosophical thought, with distinctive doctrines formulated by a founder. It is a group of thinkers, who share a similar conception of philosophy and represent for this reason a kind of “camp”. Accordingly, the term “analytic philosophy” is a family-term in Wittgenstein’s sense. Among analytic philosophers Bocheński distinguished two groups: the group committed to “hard” mathematical and logical analysis (“horse-shoe analysis”), and on the other hand, the group that practices “soft” analysis, pertaining to ordinary language (“soft-shoe analysis”). However, neither of these groups adapted a specific philosophical system. They include representatives of very different schools of thought, such as extreme Platonism, Kantianism, or Nominalism (Bocheński 1993a: 36-37).

Hence, it would be a mistake to identify analytic philosophy with a particular school of British philosophy. In fact, Bocheński recognizes, that philosophical analysis was initiated by Moore and Russell, and developed later in Cambridge, especially by Wittgenstein. Although British philosophers played a crucial role in the development and dissemination of analytic philosophy, analytic methods were likewise applied by representatives of the Vienna Circle, by Polish philosophers belonging to the Lvov-Warsaw School, as well as by thinkers from Scandinavia, Germany, and the United States. All of these thinkers adhered to the analytic tradition of Moore as well as to Russell and Whitehead’s *Principia Mathematica*, though in various ways. However, the philosophers from the Lvov-Warsaw School, though not neo-Positivists,

cultivated philosophical analysis in a way similar to that practiced within the Vienna Circle (e.g. K. Ajdukiewicz, T. Kotarbiński) – (Bocheński 1993a: 42).

In addition to Moore and Russell, Bocheński also included Frege among the founders of analytic philosophy. He attributed an indirect role in the emergence of analytic philosophy to Brentano by virtue of his influence to Meinong and Twardowski, as well as to Mach, who influenced Schlick, and other members of the Vienna Circle. A major source is Leibniz, who was the only modern thinker to combine a philosophical analysis resembling contemporary methods with the great tradition of analysis, initiated by Plato and continued by scholastics. In short, Bocheński maintains, that we owe “soft” analysis to Moore, whereas “hard” analysis is based on the emergence of mathematical logic in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The latter group, which Bocheński included himself¹, initiated a new approach to philosophy, that involved taking distance from epistemological issues and focusing instead on logic, ontology, and the analysis of language. In addition natural sciences were held up as the sole empirical foundation of the knowledge of the world (Bocheński 1993a: 42).

Despite the scientific orientation of analytic philosophy, it is not merely a form of empiricism. Although, the positivist approach has been widely accepted by the analytic philosophers, they are a number of thinkers who did not recognize empiricism, yet were in favor of analytic philosophy (e.g. Moore, Russell, Wittgenstein, and among logicians Łukasiewicz, Gödel, and Church). As Bocheński pointed out, the novelty of analytic philosophy consists precisely in the fact, that it is in the highest degree a scientific, but not positivist philosophy. In certain cases it is even considered an anti-positivist approach (e.g. K. Popper) – (Bocheński 1993a: 37).

According to Bocheński European philosophy from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries had been focused, with the notable exception of Leibniz, on creating all-inclusive metaphysical syntheses rather than on reliable science. They were truly “dark ages”, because philosophy lacked basic disciplines such as logic, semiotics, philosophy of language, and ontology.² In his opinion, the modern period brought nothing significant to philosophy, and few were thinkers, who were of note. Frames of mind that Bocheński fixed with the derogatory terms “humanism”, “subjectivism”, and “anthropocentrism” widely prevailed in philosophy, inciting philosophers to take on pseudo-problems, such as the question of the existence of the external world for instance.

Bocheński claims, that during that period philosophers were mainly concerned with the fabrication of different world-views. They took the role of prophets rather than critical thinkers, and imagined maximalist visions of the world, visions that were supposed to replace the dogmas of Christian religion. Bocheński argues that “a world-view is a set of opinion about key issues concerning the world and human life, as

¹ Examples of Bocheński's “hard” analysis include (Bocheński 1948; 1956b; 1989).

² Bocheński adds that the philosophy of love was likewise absent during this period.

well as an emotional stand, with regard to human beings” (Bocheński 1993d: 166). A world-view is a synthesis, offering an explanation of the totality of human existence, and including both a cognitive side (a set of sentences) and an emotional attitude (an emotional or affective reference to reality). A world-view is a matter of faith rather than science, due to its many unsubstantiated claims. Schleiermacher introduced the term ”Weltanschauung”, wishing to signify thereby something broader than religion, and more compatible with an atheist perspective. Philosophers espousing world-views produced in effect an *Erzatz* of prevailing religions, becoming apologists in the process. Philosophy of this kind lacks rational justification, while at the same time, it holds an unreasonable absolutist attitude. It also carries a moral evaluation and provides answers to existential questions. According to Bocheński, a claim is reasonable only if it: 1) is confirmed by a direct experience (sensory or phenomenological); 2) is proven by the correct rules of formal logic, assuming premises from which it follows rationally; 3) explains the rational sentences according to the rules of reductive inference (Bocheński 1993e: 175). A world-view philosophy does not comply with these requirements, since all it provides is a synthetic response to the existential questions concerning the meaning of life, suffering and death. These questions do not allow for rationally justifiable answers.

According to Bocheński, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century due to the discovery of mathematical logic, there was almost a complete break with the era of modern philosophy. Therefore, contemporary philosophy differs so radically from modern philosophy, as modern philosophy differed from the medieval. Ever since it became a sort of science, philosophy ceased to fabricate a world-view. As Bocheński used to say, the reliable practice of philosophy is based on analyzing rather than moralizing (Bocheński 1993d: 163). The break with modern tradition was akin to the spiritual break from the Middle Ages during the Renaissance. Contemporary philosophy offers a different approach and a completely new method. Indeed, still in to the twentieth century, there are the world-view thinkers, i.e. existentialists, but they do not have any significant importance today. Hence, everything that is important in philosophy is – according to Bocheński – analytical and scientific.

On Bocheński’ view contemporary philosophy must be analytical because in the modern world it is impossible to make a synthesis: the period of philosophical *summa* is over, and now it is the time of *encyclopedia*. It has all the important features of great philosophy which are absent in modern philosophy: it intensively studies logic, develops the philosophy of language and ontology. It also takes an objective attitude, does not create a grand synthesis and does not fabricate a world-view (see: Bocheński 1993c: 150). In this way it is similar to Husserl’s phenomenology which is the only other approach besides analytic philosophy that plays a significant role in contemporary philosophy.

When we separate philosophy as a whole, from the process of making philosophy, phenomenology is seen as a kind of analytic philosophy (Bocheński 1993a: 40-41). Despite different attitudes, there are a number of similarities between the two intel-

lectual movements: both accept an objective approach (Husserl's slogan *zu den Sachen selbst* – "back to the things themselves" directs phenomenology to the subject), and call attention to preciseness, certainty, and clearness. Both also emphasize the need of analysis, including linguistic analysis, and thus: both manifest a strong reluctance to engage in philosophy in a synthetic way. However, according to Bocheński, there is also a serious difference. Phenomenology does not use reasoning, but rather intuitions and insights, in which it attempts to recognize examined phenomena, while analytic philosophy uses reasoning and proving, treating the analysis as a theory of the meaning of concepts. Nevertheless, according to Bocheński, the aim pursued in the phenomenological approach in order to provide adequate descriptions of the sense-data can be considered as an analytical undertaking. It is the same rational undertaking, made from two different perspectives and two opposing starting points: in the case of phenomenology from the side of intuition, and in the case of analytical philosophy from the side of logic. For Bocheński one of the best examples of practicing philosophy, alternatively to analytic philosophy, is the work of the Polish philosopher Roman Ingarden.

Bocheński is aware of the fact, that analytic philosophy can be understood very differently, therefore, it is difficult to give a definition of it, that would be fully satisfactory. Faced with these difficulties he proposed an inductive procedure, or rather, a quasi-inductive procedure (Szubka 2009: 33). In order to define analytic philosophy, he takes into account thirteen philosophers, who can be regarded the analytic thinkers. Based upon their common beliefs, he attempts to determine the meaning of analytic philosophy. These thinkers – in alphabetical order – are: Ajdukiewicz, Austin, Carnap, Chisholm, R. Martin, Popper, Quine, Rescher, Ryle, Scholz, Strawson, Tarski, and Weingartner (Bocheński 1993a: 38). Bocheński states that the choice of these names, was to some extent, arbitrary³ and he could very well cite another list. Looking more closely on the mentioned thinkers, one can notice, that this list reflects certain preferences. These names are related not only to Bocheński's personal sympathies to certain philosophers, but – more importantly – they suggest a certain vision of analytic philosophy, which seemed to be the most in line with his beliefs. In most cases, they are the thinkers, who apply, like Bocheński, logical analysis of language, using the tools of contemporary mathematical logic. Bocheński does not want to define analytic philosophy, especially from a historical point of view (therefore he does not mention its initiators from Oxford: Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein), nor does he limit its impact on the circle of the English language (he also includes thinkers from the circle of Polish and German languages). So it seems, that what is common to all these philosophers, mentioned by him, is the style of philosophizing, or their specific approach to philosophical problems, focused on correct argumentation and proper use of the justification procedures.

³ Bocheński presents in his essay *O nawrocie w filozofii*, a similar definition of analytic philosophy: „By analytic philosophy, I understand this type of philosophy, which is practiced, for example, by Popper, Bunge, Quine, Ayer, Weingartner – and whose representatives in Poland were: Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbiński i Łukasiewicz” (Bocheński, 1993c: 150).

Therefore, let us consider, what really connects all these thinkers listed by Bocheński, or what conditions must be met in order to be called an analytic philosopher? First, they share an emphasis on conceptual analysis. But apart from this common feature, Bocheński adds three others: “language”, “logic”, and “objectivism”. Only when taken together, these four features or methodological rules determine the specifics of analytic philosophy. They postulate that they: 1) perform detailed analytical works; 2) investigate language; 3) proceed logically or rationally; 4) are objective (Bocheński 1993a: 38). As a pupil of Bocheński – Korneliusz Policki – rightly pointed out, that these rules are equivalent to the four classical principles of science or philosophy: subject, purpose, method, and language (see: Policki, 2005: 71-95). This reflects a deep methodological relation between Aristotelian and scholastic conception of science and contemporary analytic philosophy, about which Bocheński was deeply convinced. However, these rules are not purely methodological, since each of them assumes a specified philosophical position, leading forward to the rejection of another philosophical position. Furthermore, each of these rules and postulates of doing analytic philosophy went through radicalization that led to the distortion of proper understanding of analytic philosophy.

Let's then characterize briefly, how Bocheński understands each of these rules, and in what way he recommended their implementation.

2. Rules characterizing Analytic Philosophy

2.1. The rule of analysis

According to Bocheński, it is very difficult to give an appropriate definition of analysis because there is no consensus of what a philosophical analysis really is and what tools to use in order to make the perfect analysis. An analysis made with the help of mathematical logic differs significantly from an analysis carried out using everyday language. Furthermore no one has yet presented a reliable analysis of the analytic process. Therefore Bocheński postulates the need of preparing an appropriate handbook for philosophical analysis that could be used by novice philosophers and representatives of other sciences for their research. He points out, however, that ever since Moore, philosophers have understand some basic things about analysis. For example, that analysis begins, *inter alia*, with the determination of the type of question being asked in order to solve a problem introduced by this specific question. The idea is to understand what kind of question it is, what the meaning of the words are that have been used in its formulation, and whether this question comes from the empirical field (reality) or from the logical domain (language).

Moreover, the rule of analysis is associated with the view the knowledge of the world is very complex, so it is impossible to provide an all-encompassing synthesis. Any attempt to formulate such a synthesis will be, as we mentioned above, a project that identifies philosophy with a world-view. Resignation of the synthesis does not

mean that the analytical attitudes rule out any other synthesis. Yet building a synthesis is necessary in every science. According to Bocheński, in the age of analysis, such all-encompassing syntheses cannot be formed because of the following: 1) there is an overwhelming size of knowledge; 2) there is a more lucid understanding of the requirements of formal logic; 3) there is a much clearer sense of the limits of rationality (Bocheński 1993e: 178). In this sense, Bocheński's proposal is anti-systematic, focused on the detailed analysis and limited to particular problems. He treats his philosophical activity simply as a number of detailed contributions to different areas of philosophy. He acknowledges these contributions for revealing and enriching the legacy of thought. This activity is also concentration on more essential problems, and not on marginal issues; e.g. the definition of the world-view (see: Bocheński 1993d), the outline of the logic of religion (see: Bocheński 1965), the analysis of the concept of authority (see: Bocheński 1974a), the analysis of the free society (see: Bocheński 1986) or the analysis of an industrial company (see: Bocheński 1993b).

However, according to Bocheński, a danger is posed in radicalizing the rule of analysis that denies the cognitive sense of philosophy and limits its activity to a pure therapy. This position presents a so-called "therapeutic Wittgensteinism", which resigns from objective knowledge and focuses only on the clarification of language concepts. The primary aim of analysis becomes the removal of philosophical problems by therapeutic treatments and the correction of misused language.

2.2. The Rule of language investigation

This rule is associated with the treatment of concepts as the meaning of words and the treatment of analysis as a linguistic analysis. For the analytic philosopher language is the primary subject of philosophical inquiry. The analysis is primarily an analysis of language, especially of the concepts expressed by language. It consists of reducing complex sentences to simple elements, because the world described by the language consists of simple elements. Therefore the language becomes not only an essential tool of philosophy, but also the main subject of philosophical analysis. The pioneer of the study of thought through language was Frege, who showed how, by analyzing the concepts of language, one can reach the basic structure of thinking. This position assumes that rational beliefs are fully expressible in language, and their structure can be reduced to having a linguistic nature. Bocheński claims, that there is no other way to attain the concepts, but by analyzing the meaning of words formulated by language. This postulate requires sharp and clear usage of terms in language. Against Wittgenstein, he accepted that the meaning of the sentence, is the meaning of the individual words that make up a sentence, and not by the way in which we use these words. First of all, there is no so-called "concepts in themselves" ("*an sich*"), existing in an ideal third world. Bocheński particularly criticized the ambiguity and obscurity of using language, manifested in the great metaphysical systems of the modern era. He recalled that since the time of Brentano there is an excellent rule in using language: "it

is the ability to say what you have in mind, and to know exactly why you are saying it” (Bocheński 1988: 43).

According to Bocheński, however, the radicalization of this rule leads philosophy to a purely grammatical analysis, that for example, in Oxford, was fulfilled in the project of writing contributions to the *Oxford Dictionary*. Instead of solving philosophical problems by analyzing the language, writers focused on the very structure of linguistic expressions and the syntactic function of language.

2.3. The Rule of proceeding logically

For Bocheński, this rule is connected with the postulate of rational procedure that characterizes analytic philosophy. This is due to the recognition that reality is rational, and – as Bocheński states – “the limits of logic are the boundaries of our world” (Bocheński 1993a: 39). This position is equivalent to a rejection of all forms of irrationalism. The analytic philosophers “should be the guardians and protectors of reason” (Bocheński 1993a: 49). Bocheński claims that everything we can speak of is always within the realm of logic, whereas everything that we cannot speak of – following the Wittgenstein’s advice – we must pass over in silence (Bocheński 1975: 23). This means, that besides logic, there is only nonsense and contradiction (for Bocheński even God acts geometrically). For this reason, logic becomes the best tool for philosophical analysis. Since when we encounter contradictions, we try to remove them and clarify our thinking. Contradictions are not, in fact, aspects of the world, but the features of our thinking. If then logical analysis is linguistic in character, then philosophy is an applied logic. Therefore, the postulate of rationality simplifies to the postulate of the fidelity of the rules of rational thinking.

Bocheński points out, that one should be an analytic philosopher without using the tools of contemporary mathematical logic (thinkers representing “soft” analysis), because each philosopher who thinks correctly, will be using the rules of innate or natural logic. Philosophy, however, is a highly abstract subject, and its issues and problems are very detached (see: Bocheński 1966). Therefore, out of innate logic, one is supposed to know the rules of formal logic. It allows one to obtain the ability for the correct use of thinking at a very high level of abstraction. In addition, since the world manifests a logical structure, then axiomatic theories are the best tools to reach reality. Ontology is simply the introduction to the axiomatic theory of the thing in logic. But the logician deals with ontology only in a formal way, as the analysis of the most detached features of the thing (see: Bocheński 1974b). Although logicians do not agree on the philosophical interpretation of logic (logicism, formalism, intuitionism), the practice of formal or mathematical logic is independent of the philosophical position. For Bocheński logic is homogenous⁴, despite its multiplicity of the systems of logic.

⁴ In a broad sense, Bocheński divided logic into the following disciplines: 1) formal or mathematical logic; 2) semiotics; 3) the general methodology of science; 4) philosophy of logic (see: Bocheński 1980; Policki 2005: 34-37).

In fact, there is only one kind of logic, containing an infinitive number of subsystems. Each multi-valued system of logic includes all claims of two-valued system of logic, so each assertion, formulated in multi-valued systems of logic, can be distinctly reflected in a complex way in two-valued system of logic. The field of logic is so extensive in practice, that the logician always operates with subsystems, by selecting some section of logic (Bocheński 1988: 57-58).

However, according to Bocheński, the radicalization of this position reduces philosophy to a pure logic and brings analytical methods to the rules of formal logic (e.g. Scholz, Polish School of Logic). To bring all of philosophy to logic is a mistake, but the bigger mistake is the practice of philosophy in a manner, that goes beyond the limits designated by logic and beyond reason alone.

2.4. The Rule of objectivity

According to Bocheński, this rule does not direct analytic philosophy to self-knowledge, but rather to external objects and external reality. This cosmo-centric attitude rejects any subjectivism and anthropocentrism. It recognizes the opportunity to gain objective knowledge and to reach reality. Bocheński claims that we are naturally inclined to external objects, so in obtaining knowledge we should start from the object. Self-knowledge is secondary in comparison to the knowledge of reality. In his *Wspomnienia* he writes: "Although I highly appreciate saint Augustine, I reject his phrase categorically: *In teipsum intra, in interiorhomine habitat Veritas* – Go to yourself, truth lives in man. I am, and I always was, an objectivist. I believe that truth resides not in the mind, but in reality; and that almost everything we know, we know thanks to the preservation of the objective approach, made by science" (Bocheński 1994: 317). He then writes: "It seems to me, that my soul is *naturaliter aristotelica*. I have an innate tendency to see the world in the way as it was seen by Aristotle, and thus, as it was seen by Aquinas, who did not recognize himself in philosophy as nothing else but an Aristotelian. For instance, the belief in a cosmo-centric approach to the world and not to the self, objectivism, naturalism, a tendency for detailed analysis, and the doctrine of the unity of organisms" (Bocheński 1994: 310-311). The objectivist position is thus linked to the naturalist and scientific approach that is present in analytic philosophy.

However, the radicalization of this rule led the neo-positivists from the Vienna Circle to a position of logical positivism. This manifested itself solely by the identification of philosophy using the language of science analysis. This position eliminated some broadly understood philosophical problems and reduced philosophy to the logic of science.

According to Bocheński, when we characterize analytic philosophy through these four rules, it evokes scholastic philosophy. Contemporary analytic philosophy is not simply a return to scholastics, but rather a reference or inspiration of scholastic meth-

od. Contemporary analysis differs from the scholastic analysis in two points: 1) it applies stricter mathematical and logical criteria of rationality; 2) it is more skeptical about major syntheses that were built by scholastics. But the similarity is very large, both in method and in style; in both cases a discerning and subtle analysis was practiced; both trends includes philosophies that are oriented objectively and logically. Bocheński adds that, when he reads articles from „The Journal of Symbolic Logic”, he always has the impression of reading scholastic works (Bocheński 1993c: 151).

3. The Practical and Social Role of Analytic Philosophy

After presenting theoretical problems, Bocheński, in the second part of his inaugural lecture, transitions to practical issues. He proposes some answers to the question about widespread use of philosophical analysis in science, and its social role and importance.

According to him, when we consider the application of the analytical method, we must conclude that nowadays it is used too narrowly and esoterically in the analysis of philosophical problems. But if the goal of analytic philosophy is to perform a function similar to that served by scholastic philosophy in the Middle Ages, its methods should be valid and useful in many domains, from theology, law, economy, medicine, and humanities. Its limitation to typical philosophical problems was related to some extent with the use of a new scientific method in physics, developed by Galileo. This method eliminated ambiguity by the use of artificial language of mathematics, so there was no need for linguistic analysis. The success of this scientific method meant that conceptual analysis in the modern era has disappeared almost completely in philosophy. Bocheński points out, however, that many disciplines, especially social sciences and humanities, are not yet ready for mathematization, or that their methods do not allow for the inclusion of all of their questions to the schema of mathematics. For these sciences, philosophical analysis would be a very convenient method. Philosophy, in this sense, could serve as an auxiliary science for other disciplines, and again begin to fulfill the medieval rule of “*ancilla*” in relation to other sciences (Bocheński 1993a: 45-46). Philosophers, however, should develop general methodological principles, that clearly present the application of the rules of analysis. Bocheński, himself, made such an attempt in his book *Die Zeitgenössischen denkmethoden* (Bocheński 1954), in which he discussed some basic philosophical and scientific methods.

When it comes to the social role of philosophy, Bocheński especially protests against a vision of philosophy as a highly sophisticated activity, which deals with a handful of intellectuals, separated from life. Indeed, analytic philosophy should not, as we said, perform a function of a world-view and answer ultimate existential and moral questions. However, it should cherish the principles of reason and care for a thinking culture of society. Because in today’s world there are skeptical tendencies related to the crisis of civilization, which contribute largely to modern humanism, proclaiming the slogan that man is the measure of all things. But, according to Bocheński, skepticism

is not a well justified position, either theoretically (it can not be proven), nor practically (there is no benefits of it). So one of the tasks of philosophy is to defend reason and rationality against the threat of skepticism and the loss of faith in reason.

Besides skepticism, a high susceptibility to the influence of political and cultural ideology as well as a thoughtless submission to various contemporary superstition is – in Bocheński's opinion – extremely dangerous in today's world. So besides auxiliary function, which introduces the clarity into thinking through the analysis of concepts and methods, it is also a “demonic” function of analytic philosophy, which consists in revealing, debunking and refuting superstition, prevailing in scientific and everyday thinking. In order to meet this challenge Bocheński prepared a handbook exposing one hundred of the most popular superstitions of contemporary culture (see: Bocheński 1987). Perhaps this “demonic” function is one of the biggest practical challenges, posed by Bocheński to analytic philosophy. The analytical method is the best tool to meet this challenge. “What can fulfill this challenge? – asks Bocheński – Not religion, because it is focused on something else. Not ideologies, because those so often proclaim the worst kind of irrationalism. The only force, that could fulfill this role, is philosophy. And not every philosophy, but the one that openly in theory and practice admits to reason and rationality: the analytic philosophy” (Bocheński 1993a: 49). The need and necessity of analytic philosophy reveals in the most complete sense in unmasking the destructive function, directed against ideologies and various forms of irrationalism prevailing in our culture. In the time in which we must defend reason, a careful and accurate type of philosophy, is always on the side of true culture and in the defense of humanity.

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Józef M. Bocheński's Conception of Analytic Philosophy

Abstract: The article characterizes the main features Bocheński's conception of Analytic Philosophy. In the first part, we present the difference between Analytic Philosophy and different world-views. Then we discuss the forth rules of analysis, and finally we refer to the practical and social role of Analytic Philosophy pointed out by Bocheński.

Keywords: J.M. Bocheński, analytic philosophy, history of analysis, rules of analysis, analysis vs. synthesis, social role of analytic philosophy