

Odczyty i wykłady

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Brentano's theory of judgment and the Lvov–Warsaw School

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Introduction

I will discuss the reception of Franz Brentano's philosophy in Poland, in particular, the reception of Brentano's ideas among representatives of the Lvov – Warsaw School. However, I would like to confine myself to some Brentano's ideas: his conception of judgment and its philosophical consequences¹. I will do this, firstly, because it might be perhaps interesting to find in Brentano's heritage one idea which is on the one hand the most characteristic to Brentano and, on the other hand, exerted wide and essential influence on the Polish philosophy. Secondly, the conception of judgment in itself assumes, or implies, theories of truth, values, knowledge, theories of objects, and it also has importance for philosophical foundations of logic.

Metaphysical realism, the classic conception of truth, the absoluteness of truth and the doctrine on the intentionality of consciousness are these Brentano's

¹ About the general reception of Brentano's philosophy in Poland wrote Izydora Dąmbska and also Jan Woleński made important remarks on this theme in his classic monograph of 1989. See.: I. Dąmbska, *François Brentano et la Pensée philosophique en Pologne: Casimir Twardowski et son École*, [in:] R. M. Chisholm und R. Haller (ed.), *Die Philosophie Franz Brentanos, Beiträge zur Brentano-Konferenz*, pp.117–130, Amsterdam 1978, and J. Woleński, *Logic and the Philosophy in the Lvov–Warsaw School*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht–Boston–London, 1989.

ideas which were inherited and popularized in Poland by Brentano's disciple Kazimierz Twardowski.

I would like to trace in a more detail the role of Brentano's theory of judgment, known in Poland under the name 'idiogenetic theory of judgment', as this element of Brentano's intellectual heritage in Poland which influenced some essential achievements of Polish philosophy.

It is said that the Tarskian semantic definition of truth is the most outstanding single result of the Polish Brentanism and of the Brentanist tradition in general².

Let us assume and analyze the hypothesis that the Brentano's 'idiogenetic theory of judgment' is this single Brentano's idea which made wide and essential contribution to the Polish Brentanism and also to the semantic definition of truth proposed by Alfred Tarski.

Brentano

Brentano's theory of judgment (BTJ-I) is composed of the following statements³:

- (1) An act of judging consists in the acceptance or rejection of an object *A*;
- (2) every predicative judgment (*A* is *B*) and every categorical judgment symbolized in logic as *a*, *e*, *i*, *o* are reducible to negative existential judgments or affirmative existential judgments and judgments *a* and *e* have no existential import;
- (3) every judgment is based on a simple or a complex presentation;
- (4) the object of a judgment "*A* exists" is identical with the object of the presentation of *A*.

Additional characteristic of this theory follows from the epistemic presuppositions contained in Brentano's descriptive psychology: (BTJ-I) is an idealistic and psychologistic conception. It is idealistic because acts of judging and objects of judgments are immanent parts of mind.

(BTJ-I) is psychologistic because a judgment is an individual psychic phenomenon. From thesis (4) and Brentano's semiotic assumptions it follows that (BTJ-I)

² J. Woleński and P. Simons, *De Veritate: Austro-Polish Contributions to the Theory of Truth from Brentano to Tarski*, [in:] K. Szaniawski (ed.), *The Vienna Circle and the Lvov-Warsaw School*, Nijhoff International Philosophy Series: Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London 1989, p. 391-442

³ F. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, transl. by A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell and L. L. McAlister, Routledge&Kegan Paul, Book Two, Chapter VII, London 1973, pp. 201-254.

is the non-propositional theory of judgment, i.e. we refer to the object of a judgment by means of a name and not by a sentence.

Brentano proposed this theory after having rejected the broadly accepted conception of judgment rooted in Aristotle's epistemological and logical considerations.

According to the Aristotle's theory (ATJ), a judgment is a combination or a separation of a subject and a predicate. However, Brentano demonstrated that the Aristotelian theory was wrong. (ATJ) was wrong because there are impersonal judgments like, for example, 'It is raining' which lack a subject and there are existential judgments like 'Cheetahs exist' which lack a predicate. Thus, (ATJ) is not able to account for impersonal and existential judgments.

After having introduced the new theory of judgment Brentano had to reject the strong version of the classic concept of truth. The strong version of the concept of truth is presented by Aristotle with the help of words 'combined' and 'separated' as follows:

He who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects, is in error⁴.

The strong version of the classic concept of truth could not account for the truth of affirmative existential judgments since they are not a 'combination' of subjects and predicates and it could not account for the negative existential judgments since they are not a 'separation' of subjects and predicates.

(BTJ-I) was also incoherent with those interpretations of the classic conception of truth which appeal to the notions of 'conformity' or 'correspondence' of thought with reality. Brentano himself noticed that⁵:

If the truth of 'There is no dragon' were to be reside in a correspondence between my judgment and an object, what would be the object? Certainly not the dragon, since there isn't any dragon. Nor any other real thing which could count as the corresponding reality.

Thus he was forced to resort in defense of the classic conception of truth to such a statement which neither contains words 'combination' and 'separation', nor speaks about 'correspondence' of thought with reality. Such a statement is delivered by Aristotle in the following form (in recent epistemology called the weak version of the classic conception of truth)⁶:

⁴ *Metaphysics* 1051 b 3ff.

⁵ F. Brentano, *On the Concept of Truth*, [in:] F. Brentano, *Evidence und Wahrheit*, quotation taken from Woleński's *Theories of Truth in Austrian Philosophy*, [in:] J. Woleński, *Essays in the History of Logic and Logical Philosophy*, Jagiellonian University Press, Cracow 1999, p. 154.

⁶ J. Woleński and P. Simons, *De Veritate: Austro-Polish Contributions...*, p. 391–442, 393.

To say of what is that is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that is not, is true⁷.

Surprisingly Brentano, who was an expert on Aristotle's philosophy, did not employ the Aristotelian weak version of the classic conception of truth. Instead Brentano put forward his own weak version of truth according to which:

A judgment is true if it asserts of some object that is, that the object is, or if it asserts of some object that it is not, that this object is not – and a judgment is false if it contradicts that which is, or that which is not⁸.

However, Brentano's weak version of truth implied some ontological postulates. According to Brentano's famous doctrine on intentionality, all judgments including true negative existential judgments are intentional acts. Thus, the true negative existential judgment '*A* does not exist' has to refer intentionally to its object but it asserts that the object *A* lacks existence. Yet, the object *A* cannot be nothing, since the judgment '*A* does not exist' refers to it, under assumption, intentionally. In order to solve this trouble Brentano introduced judgment-contents (called by him sometimes '*irrealia*' or '*entia rationis*'). The true affirmative existential judgment '*A* exists' would refer, according to him, to the existence of the object *A* and the negative existential judgment '*A* does not exist' would refer to the non-existence of the object *A*. The discovery of judgment-contents led Brentano to the revision of his previous theory of judgment (BTJ-I), since the object of judgment (intentional target of judgment) was not in fact the object of presentation but the judgment-content, i.e. the existence or non-existence of the given object.

Thus (BTJ-I) compelled Brentano to reject the strong view on truth, and the rejection of the strong view on truth led him to correct (BTJ-I) and to replace it by let us called it (BTJ-II): (BTJ-I) minus (4) and plus thesis (4)':

There are judgment-contents which may be taken as the intentional target of a judgment different from the object of a presentation.

In turn, the invention of judgment-contents allowed Brentano to formulate a new version of the previously rejected correspondence notion of truth. He proposed the following definition:

⁷ *Metaphysics* 1011 b 26ff.

⁸ F. Brentano, *On the Concept of Truth...*, p. 154.

A judgment is true if and only if it corresponds with the existence or non-existence of its object.

However, if we take into account judgments-contents, then the last Brentano's definition could be as follows:

A judgment is true if and only if it corresponds with its (relevant) content.

After having discovered judgment-contents Brentano came to the conclusion that the acceptance of such entities as, for example, the existence of an apple or the non-existence of a unicorn could easily lead to counterintuitive or paradoxical consequences. Since it is allowed to speak about the existence of an apple, it is also allowed to speak about the existence of the existence of an apple and about the existence of the existence of the existence of an apple and so on *ad infinitum*. Also Brentano reasoned that since it is allowed to talk about the non-existence of a unicorn, it is allowed to talk about the existence of the non-existence of unicorn as well. Due to these consequences which seemed to Brentano to be absurd he rejected *inter alia* judgment-contents, (BTJ-II) and returned to (BTJ-I). However, he was reluctant to return to his previous weak version of the classic conception of truth.

Therefore, Brentano proposed finally the epistemic definition of truth and the first clear step leading to such a definition was the statement:

If *A* is, then whoever accepts or affirms *A* judges correctly, and if *A* is not, then whoever rejects or denies *A* judges correctly. The formula does not at all require that, if there is no *A*, then there has to be something else – the non-being – to function in its place. *A* itself is the thing with which our judgment is concerned⁹.

One could explain how (BTJ-I) works in the case of the last definition, which directly precedes the Brentano's epistemic and nominalistic theory of truth, as follows: the true affirmative and predicative judgment '*A* is *F*' (for example 'This house is green') is, according to (BTJ-I: (2)), transformed into the judgment '*AF*

⁹ Ibidem, p. 155. I do not discuss other reasons which Brentano had or could have had for rejection of the classic concept of truth. Brentano was convinced that the fundamental objection against the classic conception of truth was connected with true negative existential judgments. A. Chrudzimski points out that essential for the acceptance of epistemic concept of truth by Brentano was his conceptualism and Jan Woleński stresses that the most powerful objection raised by Brentano against the classic theory was the problem of the 'third observer.

exists'. Next, 'AF exists' is, according to (BTJ-I: (1)), transformed into the judgment 'AF is accepted'. Thus (BTJ-I) works without judgment-contents and reduces predicative judgments to judgments expressing mental attitude to a simple or complex but non-propositional object¹⁰.

One should add that not only (BTJ-J) but (BTJ-II) as well is an idealistic and psychologistic conception of judgment. Idealism of (BTJ-II) is the direct consequence of idealism of (BTJ-I); since an object of a presentation is an immanent object and has being only in a relation to a presentation, so the content of a judgment based on a given presentation, i.e. the existence of a given object also has to be an immanent entity.

Twardowski

It was Twardowski who made Brentano's ideas known in Poland, included his theory of judgment. For Twardowski one of the most important philosophical problems was the concept of truth. However, he was perfectly aware that any definition of truth presupposes some doctrine on the 'essence of judgment'¹¹. Therefore, on numerous occasions in his scientific and pedagogical activity discussed judgment theories and always defended the views proposed by Brentano. The first time he touched upon the concept of judgment in his habilitation *On the Content and Object of Presentations* (1894)¹². He refers at the very beginning of his work to Brentano's considerations about judgment-theory, in particular, to the problem of what is the object of judgment.

Twardowski remarks on this issue are based on Brentano's *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* and chapter VII of the second Book of his *Psychology...* It is, however, striking that the concept of judgment which Twardowski puts forward in *On the Content* differs from the view on judgment contained in (BTJ-I) and is coherent to a certain degree with the concept of judgment described in (BTJ-II). Although, as we know, (BTJ-I) is based on Brentano's considerations included in *Psychology* and (BTJ-II) is based on Brentano's later texts. Twardowski clearly speaks about judgment-content and understands by it the existence of the object of a judgment or the non-existence of the object of a judgment. He accepts, however, thesis (4) (BTJ-I). The source of the difference concerning the

¹⁰ This is so because one can refer to the object of the judgment 'This house is green' by the name 'this green house'.

¹¹ K. Twardowski, *Teoria poznania (Lectures on theory of cognition)*, [in:] *Archiwum Historii filozofii i myśli społecznej* 1975, Vol. 21, p. 254.

¹² K. Twardowski, *On the Content and Objects of Presentations*, eng. trans. by R. Grossmann, Nijhoff, The Hague 1977.

issue of judgment-contents between the two philosophers may be the following one: Brentano in 1874 claims that the assertion of the existence of *A* amounts to the assertion of *A* itself (the same can be said about the rejection of *A*). He does not claim, at least explicitly, that the assertion of *A* is equivalent to the assertion of the existence of *A* or that it implies the assertion of the existence of *A*. Twardowski, contrary to Brentano, postulates that by the assertion of *A* also the existence of *A* is asserted. The other reason for the difference between Twardowski and Brentano on judgment-contents may be the terminology used by Brentano in 1874. On the one hand, Brentano often speaks in *Psychology* about the content of a presentation and about the content of a judgment. On the other hand, however, he talks about the object of a presentation and the object of a judgment. Yet it is clear that Brentano in 1874 by 'content' and by 'object' meant just the same entity¹³. If Twardowski did not notice that according to Brentano, content and object is the same item, he could ground his introduction of judgment-contents in 1894 on what he took to be Brentano's view in 1874.

Twardowski mentions judgment-contents in the context of the theory of judgment and not in the context of the concept of truth. Twardowski nowhere in *On the Content* does provide a definition of truth or considerations on truth.

Twardowski's habilitation is concerned with the concept and ontology of presentation and not with the theory of judgment. However, what Twardowski says about presentations makes essential contribution to his conception of judgment. Both (BTJ-I) and (BTJ-II) were characterized by immanentism and psychologism. In 1894 Twardowski in fact rejects the immanentistic theory of judgment. He argues that there is a clear distinction between act, content and object of presentation. In particular, he demonstrates that the content of a presentation is immanent to the mind and the object of a presentation is transcendent in relation to the mind. However, according to the thesis (4), the object of a presentation is the object of a judgment. Therefore, the object of a judgment is external in relation to the mind too.

An intentional relation between judgment and its object ceases to be an immanent relation obtaining between the elements of mind and begins to be a relation between the mind and external world. It also follows from this that the content of a judgment is external not immanent, since the object of a judgment is external, then its existence or non-existence has to be external too. Twardowski does not state it explicitly in 1894, but later on in his lectures dedicated to the theory of cognition he insists that the existence of an object is absolutely separate and independent of mind.

¹³ F. Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, transl. by A. C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell and L. L. McAlister, Routledge&Kegan Paul, London 1973, pp. 138, 202.

Thus Twardowski in 1894 adopted (BTJ-II) but rejected its immanentism. In that time he could easily formulate one of the weak versions of the classic concept of truth and he did it later on in his lectures which were devoted to the theory of cognition.

Twardowski's further important modification of Brentano's theory of judgment consists in his abandonment of Brentanian psychologism. Judgment, according to psychologism, is a psychic phenomenon (a changeable, time – and mind-dependent entity), and therefore, it cannot be the firm bearer of time-mind-and-place-independent truths. Neither could judgment in psychological sense support stable semantic relation between language and world. Judgment as a mental phenomenon rooted in a conscious life of an individual human can not provide a philosophical basis for development of propositional logic operating on logical abstracts.

Twardowski, as is well known, in 1900 very strongly defended the absoluteness of truth. His main argument against relativism consists in the distinction between expressions (*powiedzenia*) and judgments. A judgment is regarded here as the product of mental activity (act of judging) and truth is understood by Twardowski as a true judgment¹⁴. According to Twardowski, judgments, contrary to sentences expressing judgments and *implicitly* contrary to acts of judging producing judgments were to be unchangeable, time and mind-independent entities. They had to be such entities since they were to be the bearers of the absolute time-and mind-independent truth. However, they could not be the bearers of the absolute truth because they were individual real products of individual real episodes – acts of judging. Thus, there is a discrepancy between the thesis that the truth is an absolute concept and the thesis that it is predicated of ontologically relative entities which come into existence and very soon pass away.

Twardowski solved the problem of judgments as the bearers of absolute truth in 1912¹⁵. Judgment is treated here as a double product. Firstly, it is the product of an individual process of judging, as it was in (1900), but, secondly, it is the product of abstraction made on sets of many comparable but in fact different individual judgments. As the product of individual judging a judgment is understood in the psychological sense but as the product of a process of abstraction it is understood as judgment in the logical sense, i.e. as a proposition. Thus in 1912 Twardowski found a much better candidate to the role of the bearer of the absolute truth. It was proposition. Moreover, judgment *qua* proposition is regarded by Twardowski as the meaning of a sentence and sentences not only express

¹⁴ K. Twardowski, *O tak zwanych prawdach względnych*, Lwów 1900, reprinted in: K. Twardowski, *Artykuły i rozprawy filozoficzne*, Lwów 1927, pp. 64–93.

¹⁵ Idem, *O czynnościach i wytworach*, Lwów 1912, reprinted in: K. Twardowski, *Artykuły i rozprawy...*, pp. 96–128.

propositions but support their objectivity. This theory of proposition allowed Twardowski to reject definitely Brentanian psychologism connected with (BTJ-I) and (BTJ-II).

If we take into account all what has been said so far, we can summarize Twardowski's view on judgments in 1912 as follows: Twardowski accepted (BTJ-II) liberated by him from immanentism and psychologism. He abandoned immanentism already in 1894 due to his theory of content of presentation and he abandoned psychologism due to his conception of absoluteness of truth. (BTJ-II) in the form of 1912 provided means to formulate the weak version of the classic concept of truth, supplied ontological basis for propositional logic (it was the concept of an abstract judgment expressed by a sentence as its meaning) and it allowed to ground semantics as the theory of relations between language and world. Twardowski later replaced the name 'the content of judgment' with 'the ground' of judgment (*osnowa*)¹⁶.

The most systematic treatment of judgments in Twardowski's works is contained in his lectures on the theory of cognition which he gave in the years 1924-1925. We may assume that matters and theses presented in these lectures were proposed by Twardowski in his previous lectures before the year 1925 and they represent his mature doctrine on judgments.

We find in these lectures one crucial complement of Twardowski's account of judgment. This is the definition of true and false judgments which is fully compatible with Brentano's theory of judgment. It states that:

An affirmative judgment is true, if its objects exists, a negative judgment is true, if its object does not exist; an affirmative judgment is false, if its object does not exist, and a negative judgment is false, if its object does exists¹⁷.

Apart from the definition of truth Twardowski argued that the Brentanian theory of judgment does not allow to conceive existence as a predicate. He reasoned as follows: if the existence of an object were a predicate, then it would lead to false consequences. Therefore the existence is not a predicate, existential judgments are not predicative, and the combination or separation of concepts is not a constitutive feature of judgment. The Anselmian ontological argument for the existence of God was Twardowski's favorite example illustrating that the assumption, according to which, existence is a predicate leads to false consequences¹⁸.

¹⁶ It is well documented in K. Twardowski, *Teoria poznania...*

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 268.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 265.

From the philosophical point of view, however, the most interesting part of Twardowski's lectures on epistemology from 1925 was his refutation of the Bertrand Russell's theory of judgment, facts as specific propositional correlates of judgments, and, in consequence, the disapproval of the strong version of the classic concept of truth implied by the Russelian theory of judgment.

According to Russell, a judgment consists in the relation between mind and object. If an object of a judgment were a simple, nominal entity like for example Desdemona's love to Cassio, then false judgments would be impossible. It is so because, if Desdemona's love to Cassio does not exist, then there is no relation of mind to Desdemona's love to Cassio. However, if there is no relation of mind to object, then there is no judgment at all. Thus, there would be only true judgments and no false judgments. In order to avoid such a conclusion one should postulate that the object of judgment should be a complex syntactically structured entity composed of more than one constituent. Thus the judgment 'Desdemona loves Cassio' refers to the complex built of three objects: Desdemona, Cassio and Desdemona's love to Cassio. In the case of false judgments like in our example, judgment refers to existing objects and combines them into a complex which does not exist. According to this conception, judgment can combine concepts referring to objects and bring them together into one complex (state of affairs) because there is a relation between a judging mind and objects. This relation, however, is possible because there exist objects which can be composed into one complex in a judgment although they in fact (as in the case of a false judgment) need not constitute any complex (for example there is no complex consisting of Desdemona, Cassio and their love but there exist Desdemona and Cassio).

The general conclusion from Russell's theory of judgment is the following one: a judgment consists in combination or separation of concepts (ideas) and the object of a judgment differs from the object of a presentation; it has a propositional nature. If it were not the case, then, according to Russell, there would be no false judgments, since there are of course false judgments, then judgments consist in combination of ideas. It follows from this too that the truth should be grasped as the correspondence between a judgment and a fact, i.e. that one should accept the strong version of the classic conception of truth¹⁹.

It is obvious that Russell's theory of judgment is incompatible with Brentano's and Twardowski's views on judgments. Therefore, it is not surprising that Twardowski analyzed it in detail in his lectures. The conclusion which Twardowski drew was firm and explicit: Russell's conception of judgments, facts and truth were false because they were based on a false assumption. The assumption in

¹⁹ B. Russell, *The Problems of Philosophy*, London 1912.

question concerns the nature of relation: the relation between some terms A and B obtains if and only if A and B exist. According to Twardowski, this assumption is false because we can think about something which does not exist²⁰. The Russellian assumption had to look false to Twardowski who accepted the Brentanian doctrine on intentionality and believed that non-existent objects may have properties. He claimed that general objects, including mathematical objects (numbers and geometrical figures), do not exist but they are nonetheless subjects of properties. Therefore, there are relations among them for example $7 > 5$, although numbers 7 and 5 do not exist. Twardowski's reasoning could be as follows: if there are relations between two non-existent terms, then it is possible, that there are relations between one existent and one or more non-existent terms. The last case is illustrated by the judgment 'The round square does not exist'; there exists a mental act (the presentation of the round square upon which this judgment is based) related intentionally to the non-existent object, i.e. round square.

Thus for Twardowski a relation is not a complex object (a fact or a state of affairs). According to him, the proposition ' aRb ' is reducible to an existential form '(Relation) R exists'. However, the existence of R does not presuppose the existence of objects a and b , hence there is no complex object composed of a , b and R . If the assertion of the R 's existence implied the assertion of the existence of objects a and b , then it would follow that general objects exist but it would be inconsistent with Twardowski's ontology. And if for some relations the existence of their terms is an irrelevant property, then, with regard to philosophical universality, for all relations it is not a relevant property.

Twardowski's dismissal of facts and states of affairs is peculiar because it is not motivated by ontological considerations, as it was in the case of the later Brentano or Kotarbiński but, on the contrary, it has as its basis a rich and bold ontology embracing non-existent general objects like numbers, figures, and fictitious entities like unicorns.

In this context a comment may be needed to Twardowski's view presented in his letter of 1897 to Alexius Meinong. In that letter Twardowski insisted that it would be convenient to introduce the distinctions between content and object of presentation on the one hand and between content and object of judgment (called by Twardowski *Sachverhalt* ('state of affairs')) on the other²¹. By the content of judgment Twardowski meant in the letter to Meinong the existence or non-existence of the state of affairs, and by a state of affairs he understood either an

²⁰ K. Twardowski. *Teoria poznania...*, p. 264.

²¹ B. Smith, *Kasimir Twardowski: On Content and Object* [in:] B. Smith, *Austrian Philosophy: the Legacy of Franz Brentano*, Open Court, Chicago and La Salle 1994, pp. 155–191, 174.

absolute datum, or relation, or both together. However, he neither developed this idea later, nor propagated it among his disciples.

It was so presumably because he never gave up Brentano's theory of judgment and because of his ontological assumptions which we discussed above.

One version of his theory of judgment (BTJ-II) admits some specific entities like judgment-contents, i.e. the existence or non-existence of something, but it does not permit complex entities formed in predicative judgment as '*a is b*', or in the relational judgment as '*aRb*'. Propositional entity called 'state of affairs' and understood as a combination or a complex of objects bound by some relation could be only constituted – Twardowski might have reasoned – in a predicative or in a relational judgment. This, however, would mean that at least some judgments consist in combination or separation of concepts but it would be incoherent with both Brentano's theories.

One may ask, why, according to Brentano and Twardowski, propositional entities cannot be constituted by propositionally articulated presentations? I think that there is at least one reason why it is not possible. It is cognitive and semantic atomism shared by Brentano and Twardowski (Twardowski's case, however, is more complicated because of his theory of concepts, according to which, concepts are constructed by means of presented judgments).

According to cognitive atomism, in order to make a judgment, one must have knowledge about the judged object. This means, however, that one has to bring the object before the mind and contemplate it in a presentation. In order to know what is a certain complex object of a complex presentation, for example a 'green tree' one should know before what is 'green' and what is 'tree'. But in order to know all that, one must have a separate presentation of 'a tree' and a separate presentation of 'green'. These simple presentations, however, have no propositional articulation and are expressed in language by names. The same can be said about a presentation of a relation *R* between objects *a* and *b*. Thus all propositional knowledge is based on non-propositional knowledge and is reduced to such a knowledge. Therefore we refer to judgments correlates by means of names, and not sentences. This claim is expressed by thesis (3) contained in Brentano's theory of judgment.

It is worth to note here that J. Daubert – one of Husserl's disciples – criticized Anton Marty for such atomistic views. The latter upheld Brentano's theory of judgment. Daubert claimed that terms used in judgments make sense only as inserted into their judgmental complexes. Karl Schumann explains Daubert's position as follows:

Names do not possess an independent basic meaning which must first be modified appropriately in order that they be capable of functioning satisfactorily in the context of a judgment. Rather, and in contrast to such atomistic views, priority must be awarded to the judgment as a whole, the structure of which determines the concrete way in which the terms it contains must be understood, and the way the corresponding objects are to be delineated²².

The strong belief in the non-propositional character of knowledge prevented Brentano and Twardowski from accepting the view that although judging would not consist in combination of concepts, nonetheless, the judged object could have a propositional structure articulated by a sentence and be a complex of more than one object (Twardowski for short time, as was said above accepted such a view). A judgment could consist in the assertion of the existence of some propositionally articulated entity, e.g. '*S* is *P*' and be represented by the form $+p$ or $-p$ where '*p*' would be a symbol of an indicative sentence, '+' be a symbol of affirmation and '-' a symbol of rejection²³. Such a propositional theory of presentation could lead to the following definition of truth:

A proposition '*p*' is true if and only if there exists the state of affairs described by *p*.

Another reason why they did not develop more sophisticated theory of state of affairs was their belief that all judgments are reducible to existential judgments²⁴.

²² K. Schumann, *Contents of Consciousness and States of Affairs*, [in:] K. Mulligan (ed.), *Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht–Boston–London 1990, p. 197–214, p. 211. Such a non-atomistic position is defended also by Wittgenstein: 'Only the proposition has a sense; only in the context of a proposition does a name have a meaning'. (*Tractatus* 3.3). Daubert as well rebutted the thesis (2) postulating the reduction of all categorical judgments to the existential form. According to him, a judgment does not consist of a subject picturing some object given to us, to which we add a predicate describing some property of this object. 'The judgment rather contains an S-as-related-to-P, an S *qua* P, and correlatively it does not refer to objects or even substances and their accidents, but rather to complexes into which objects with their properties may, or may not fit, but into which there may be fitted also, e.g. events with their moments, concepts with their characteristics, and so on.' *Ibidem*, p. 206.

²³ Frege and Husserl proposed that a judgment is always an assertion of some propositional positive or negative 'judgeable content' (in Frege's terminology); or 'matter' (in the Husserlian language).

²⁴ Yet another reason which Twardowski could have for the rejection of states of affairs was that, according to him, defining truth with help of the concept of state of affairs could lead to unaccep-

The Brentanian theory of judgment was adopted in many ways by Twardowski's disciples. Let us point out very shortly some traces of the theory in question.

Kotarbiński was inclined to treat judgment (understood in his reistic sense as a kind of behavior of a concrete person) in terms of *acceptance* or *rejection* that 'it is so and so'²⁵.

More important, however, is that Kotarbiński's disagreement with Twardowski's theory of judgments and judgment-contents led him to discover yet another formula for the weak version of the classic concept of truth. He says that:

John thinks truly if and only if John thinks that things are so and so, and things are indeed so and so²⁶.

A similar formulation is given by Alfred Tarski as an intuitive explanation of the classic concept of truth. Tarski states that:

A true sentence is one which says that things are so and so, and things indeed are so and so²⁷.

Tarski consciously and explicitly based his intuitive definition of truth on Kotarbiński's formula although there is one evident difference between Tarski's and Kotarbiński's definitions. Kotarbiński employed the adverbial mode of speaking on truth (*X truly thinks:...*) and Tarski did not²⁸.

Ajdukiewicz employed the idea of acceptance and rejection of sentences in his project of radical conventionalism and afterwards he abandoned it. But, he made use of these Brentanian concepts (of acceptance and rejection) in relation to language and imposed upon them a pragmatic sense instead of a psychological

table consequences. He thought that such a definition would follow that states of affairs described by true sentences would be identical. Such an opinion reported Ludwik Borkowski and it was told him by Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa. See A. Biłat, *Prawda i stany rzeczy*, Lublin 1995, p. 48.

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 106.

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 112 (in English edition, p. 106f.)

²⁷ A. Tarski, *Pojęcie prawdy w językach nauk dedukcyjnych*, Warszawa 1933. The English translation of Tarski's work on truth by J. H. Woodger present in A. Tarski, *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics*, Oxford University Press 1956 (second edition 1983) contains the expression 'state of affairs' instead of 'things' what is rather a misinterpretation of Tarski's intention.

²⁸ J. Woleński, *Reism in the Brentanist Tradition*, [in:] L. Albertazzi, M. Libardi and R. Poli, *The School of Brentano*, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht-Boston-London 1996, pp. 357-375, 370.

one as it was in the case of Brentano's theory. By an asserted or rejected object Ajdukiewicz understood a linguistic entity, i.e. a sentence and proposition as the logical meaning of a sentence.

The influence of 'idiogenetic theory of judgment' can be found in ethical considerations of Twardowski and Czeżowski as well. Czeżowski's concept of value as a kind of an item asserted in evaluations, in analogy to the existence asserted in judgments is perhaps the best evidence of the impact exerted by Brentano's theory of judgments on ethics in Poland.

It is a characteristic feature of Polish Brentanism that it did not develop the ontology of state of affairs and one of reasons why it did not happen was, in my view, the dominant position of Brentano's 'idiogenetic theory of judgment'. Those Brentano's students who rejected his teaching on judgments, among others Husserl and his school (Ingarden, Reinach, Daubert), and Meinong built more or less sophisticated theories of *Sachverhalte*.