także temat zapożyczeń leksykalnych, dokonują klasyfikacji zapożyczeń oraz w zwięzły sposób przedstawiają, jakie obce słowa wchodziły do języka polskiego od początków państwa polskiego poprzez poszczególne stulecia aż do współczesnej polszczyzny. W ostatniej części rozdziału poruszają zagadnienie europejskiej ligii językowej i podają charakterystyczne cechy, które łączą słownictwo języków współtworzących ligę.

Aby móc przedstawić w miarę pełny obraz języka, należy wkraczać z opisami językowymi na grunt różnych dziedzin wiedzy. Dlatego w ostatnim rozdziale pt. *Pogranicza językoznawstwa* autorzy w obszerny sposób przedstawiają cztery wybrane dyscypliny naukowe, które pozwalają pogłębiać wiedzą o języku:

1. Socjolingwistykę, która ujmuje język jako zjawisko społeczne.
2. Pragmatykę językową, która zajmuje się opisem języka na tle działalności człowieka w ogóle.
3. Psycholingwistykę, która opisuje funkcjonowanie mózgu w czasie tworzenia i odbioru mowy oraz porusza zagadnienia związane z filogenezą i ontogenezą mowy.
4. Etnolingwistykę, badającą związki między językiem a kulturą. Warto podkreślić, że autorzy w tym kontekście przytaczają hipotezę Sapira-Whorfa o różnicach między systemami języ-

kowymi zdeterminowanymi odmienną interpretacją rzeczywistości pozajęzykowej.

Problematyka pracy jest ciekawa i może być przydatna zarówno dla nauczycieli akademickich, którzy mogą wykorzystać zawarty w niej materiał na zajęciach ze wstępu do językoznawstwa na kierunkach filologicznych i neofilologicznych, jak również dla studentów zainteresowanych problematyką językoznawczą i stałym podnoszeniem efektywności swojego kształcenia językowego.

Izabela Bawej

Jonas Pfister, *The Metaphysics and the Epistemology of Meaning*, Frankfurt 2007, ss. 148

In 2007 a German publishing house known for publications in philosophy – ontos – released a book which is akin both to philosophy as well as, surprisingly, to linguistics. Within the domain of philosophy, the book is tangential to metaphysics and epistemology, more specifically however it is on the philosophy of language, whereas the linguistic part of the work rests on claims stemming from pragmatics, wherein J. Pfister drops the extant Grice's ideas on implicature and draws on more recent developments in the field.

The structure of the book is very clear. The first part touches

upon the problem of, as the author calls it, the metaphysics of meaning and it centres on important preliminary questions such as 'what is meant?', 'what is said?', and 'what is implicated?' by immersing these questions in several theories: the classical Gricean theory of implicatures and some theories which thrive on it, known as post-Gricean developments, in particular those expounded by scholars with a philosophical bias, such as R. Carston, K. Bach, F. Recanati, as well as S. Levinson, who is more linguistics-oriented. The 'metaphysical' part studies the problem of communication from the point of view of the sender who codes their intentions by means of words and transmits thus packaged information to the hearer. How the recipient interprets this information, i.e. how we recover what is meant, is appropriated to epistemology of meaning, which is expounded in part two.

Gricean theory of implicatures, of what is said, as well as semantic underspecification receive due attention in part one. The book starts with some speculations on the apparently simple question of what is said, which is believed to render, however, at least three different readings: (1) somebody said something and he meant that p.; (2) somebody said something and it means p.; (3) somebody said something and he asserted that p. The

first meaning focuses on the speaker's intentions, the second case corresponds to the meaning of the utterance, and the third meaning encompasses the previous two.

What is said can be juxtaposed with what is conventionally implicated. In the utterance *He is an Englishman*; *he is, therefore, brave*, one assumes that being brave is a consequence of being an Englishman or the other way round, it occurs, however, only when one designates an entity which satisfies both conditions, as the implication is not overtly expressed by this utterance. Pfister expresses his doubt as to the usefulness of conventional implicature (claiming that conventional implicature is a myth), which is intuitively believed to have no affect on an utterance, arguing against it on the basis of expressions like 'on the other hand', 'but', or 'therefore' on the grounds that, adhering to Frege's theory of language:

"What is said in a sentence is what is objective (…). The contrast expressed by "but" is subjective. Therefore that contrast does not belong to what is said. (…). Ideas in the speaker's mind should not affect the truth of an utterance" (Pfister 2007: 27).

Freed from Grice's notion of conventional implicature, Pfister next disagrees with Bach (1999)) as: (1) the fact that "locutions do not encode a single meaning and so they do not provide a uniform con-

225

tribution to truth-conditional content" does not guarantee that "'but' generates a conventional implicature"; (2) "what locutions like "but" often convey is not part of what the speaker is asserting but rather part of the common ground" yet "common ground is not what is conventionally implicated".

Arguably, sentences which express our mental states (e.g. I feel angry) constitute a different case, for they speak about the state of the speaker's mind. They are true then iff the speaker feels angry, and thus they belong to what is said, as in "She was poor but she was honest" the contrast introduced by 'but' is – as claimed by Pfister – what is said. The utterance becomes false, as Pfister maintains, if the *contrast* is not true. In other words, it is contrast, i.e. expressing some attitude, which is at issue here:

"*She was poor but she was honest* does not perform a second-order speech act of expressing a contrast between his saying that she was poor and his saying that she was honest. Rather, he is expressing a contrast between the fact that she was honest." (Pfister 2007: 29).

Another pocket of criticism against Grice concerns his definition of locution. Pfister supplants Grice's thesis by his own notion of locution which he takes further and divides it into two types: one which encodes attitude about the world (and this one is dubbed 'what is primarily said') and one which performs second-order speech acts. Having briefly analysed locutions with 'but' he comes to the conclusion that, as mentioned above, in the sentence *She was poor but she was honest* the speaker contrasts the *fact* that she was poor and that she was honest, rather than the saying that she was poor and that she was honest, and therefore sentence modifiers such as 'but' cannot but ascribe to second-order speech acts wherein what is said equals what is meant. Interestingly, Pfister signals the possibility of a speaker being engaged in performing speech acts at two levels simultaneously, which are different yet related, and these are the ground-floor statements, i.e. locutions (lower-order speech acts) and higher-order speech acts (commenting on lower-order speech acts).

Dissatisfied with the theories available, i.e. with Grice and some post-Gricean developments, the author proposes his own solution by extending the notion of what is said to engulf (1) what is meant, and (2) what is determined by conventional meaning (occurrence of utterance-type sentence) alike, and in addition to that (i.e. to what Grice states) Pfister also introduces the requirement that the speaker should believe (2). The extended doxastic version of what is said, however, makes it hard to distinguish, as Pfister (p. 91) admits fol-

226

lowing Levinson (2000), between what is said and what is implicated.

In the introduction to his book Pfister asks himself an anchoring question: "Is what is said semantic or pragmatic?". This question seems to reverberate in contemporary linguistics with increasing loudness. The semantic/pragmatic interface has been the goal of discussion in dynamic approaches to meaning, and it is discernable in the proposals of at least several scholars, for example in Wierzbicka (two pragmatics), Lewandowska-Tomaszczyk (dynamic semantics), and Jaszczolt (default semantics). It seems, thus, that Pfister has joined this debate by expressing his argumentation in his original book.

As noticed by Jaszczolt (2002: 252), Bach and Levinson[8], albeit employing different principles, "opt for the middle ground between what is said and what is implicated (...) whereas Carston, Sperber and Wilson, and Recanati subsume this middle level under *what is said*". Jaszczolt's *Default Semantics* (2007), too, absorbs the middle level into semantics and thus what is at stake here is pragmatic, context-dependent information which, if not in some cases

unnecessary in assuring meaning, is treated on equal footing with other vehicles of meaning, such as sentence processing output or default *intentions* which "secure the salient reading" (ibid.). Pragmatic meaning is thus meant to, as Jaszczolt puts it (2002: 253), "contribute to the semantic, truth-conditional representation of the utterance" (and not the other way round). It seems, if I am not mistaken, that Pfister, just like Jaszczolt, attributes the middle ground consisting of default inferences (which roughly corresponds to what Levinson calls utterance type and what Grice calls generalized conversational implicature) to the logical form.

This problem aside, Pfister also discards universal underdetermination on the grounds that, supposedly, it may lead to absurd consequences of inability to determine (1) literal meaning; (2) the content of our thoughts, and eventually making communication impossible. Not gratuitously, Pfister thus proposes his extended notion of what is said, as described above. However, what Pfister means here is, it seems, not so much underdetermination as underspecification, the latter defined by Jaszczolt (2007: 10) as applying to semantic representation rather than to an output of information processing at sentence level, which is believed to be underdetermination.

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[8] As noticed by Jaszczolt (2007) Levinson defends this level of meaning as separate from semantics and pragmatics, while Bach postulates a syntactic approach to the middle ground.

The second part of the book — the epistemology of meaning, i.e. the process of understanding a message in a pragmatic context — gives a brief account of three theories: code theory, Gricean theory, the relevance theory of Sperber and Wilson, and the game-theoretic theory. Code theory, developed by Shannon and Weaver (1949) for purposes related to engineering has, according to Pfister, three basic problems when it comes to communication: (1) the hearer/decoder cannot be absolutely sure whether the message which is decoded has an utterance-type meaning (i.e. whether the utterance is a token of the type at issue); (2) the theory does not solve the problem of disambiguation; (3) the theory does not take into consideration the context of an utterance and thus it is invalid for the explanation of semantic underdetermination. With hindsight, the Gricean theory, too, encounters problems when it comes to alternative interpretations of what is said or of what is implicated. The relevance theory in turn is criticized for either facing similar problems as Grice's theory or even for having no power to explain anything. The last option strongly advocated by Pfister, the game theory, brings into play Lewis's signalling game (1969) which has been transplanted onto the ground of pragmatics by Parikh (2000) as the *game of partial infor-*

mation (in pragmatics sensu largo the game theory is also present in Watzlawick et al. 1967). In line with the game theory, the outcome of a game is computable, and so are the moves of the players, as things are analysed mathematically in terms of probability. Parikh claims that both the speaker's meaning as well as the hearer's interpretation of this meaning is predictable. Decisive role plays the game theory in the *processes* of communication, as "game theory helps to better understand how what is meant is understood" (Pfister 2007: 129). Interestingly, the game theory does not affect the metaphysics of meaning but only its epistemology. The process of communication allows players to arrive at the same meaning/interpretation (solution) with the caveat that the speaker and the hearer share knowledge of the speaker's intentions. All is well if they do, but satisfying this condition is not possible in all pragmatic contexts and thus, it seems, this theory suffers from the unwelcome consequence of being applicable to a limited number of contexts.

Taken together, the original concepts presented by Pfister revolve around two problems connected with message meaning: one seen from the perspective of the speaker (the metaphysics of meaning) and one seen from the perspective of the hearer (the epistemology of meaning). The focus of

228

attention in Pfister's analysis is on the speaker's intention, and it is intention which is identified with meaning. In this respect, Pfister conforms to ideas advocated by, e.g. *default semantics*. In the metaphysics of meaning, utterance-type meaning is relegated to formal proposition which is in line with some of the neo-Gricean approaches mentioned above. In the epistemology of meaning the point of gravity is placed on the players of the 'game' (interaction) and their shared knowledge which allows them to calculate probability of moves of players in the game and thus to interpret the speaker's intentions. Although the game theory employed in the study of utterances unfolded by Pfister may seem controversial, and, as any new approach, should not be assumed on trust, it is amenable to speculations. Pfister's ideas on the metaphysics of meaning, on the other hand, seem to be convergent with some neo-Gricean developments advocated by a number of scholars who can be set within the semantics/pragmatics paradigm. Since intention plays such a crucial role in meaning identification, it is tractable, albeit indirectly, not only to philosophy of language (in particular phenomenology, cf. e.g. Jaszczolt 2007) but also to psycholinguistic research on language processing (in particular language comprehension). It seems that this fact makes Pfister's book an interesting contribution to the discussion on a cognitive orientation of pragmatics, which understands pragmatics as "a capacity of the mind, a kind of information-processing system, a system for interpreting a particular phenomenon in the world, namely human ostensive communicative behaviour" (Carston 2002: 6).

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Stanisław Puppel (red.), Społeczeństwo – kultura – język: w stronę interakcyjnej architektury komunikacji, UAM, Poznań 2007, ss. 162

W roku 2007 Katedra Ekokomunikacji, działająca na Uniwersytecie im. Adama Mickiewicza, z okazji pięciolecia swojego istnienia wydała wolumin poświęcony zagadnieniom szeroko pojętej komunikacji. Tom ten, który zainicjował nową serię pt. *Prace Naukowe Katedry Ekokomunikacji UAM*, wydawaną w ramach *Scripta de Communicatione Posnaniensi*, jest wycinkiem kilkuletnich badań nad różnymi aspektami komunikacji prowadzonych przez pracowników Katedry. Przedstawione artykuły są zatem przede wszystkim wynikiem badań własnych, których asumptem stały się zagadnienia osadzone w interdyscyplinarności i *trans*lingwiźmie, i które, choć rozmaite w swoim zakresie, obejmują kwestie tak różnorodne, jak 'język i środowisko', 'język i kultura', 'język i media' czy 'komunikacja specjalistyczna', tworząc wspólną płaszczyznę rozważań nad komunikacyjnym ekosystemem człowieka.

Tom otwiera bardzo interesujący artykuł poświęcony kulturowym i komunikacyjnym aspektom humoru. Autorka – **Marta Grześkowiak** – podkreśla we wstępnej części artykułu, że istotną cechą żartów jest ich funkcja spajająca członków wspólnoty, a tym samym budująca zbiorową tożsamość i tworząca poczucie solidarności jej członków (w sensie makro, np. społeczeństwo, jak i w sensie mikro, np. grupy zawodowe). Inną funkcją jest nadawanie płynności i harmonii interakcji między konkretnymi interlokutorami.

W części empirycznej Autorka upatruje źródeł różnic w humorze polskim i angielskim w kontekście społeczno-kulturowym i odmienności historycznej (np. w tradycjach, zwyczajach), ale również – co ciekawe – w kontekście geograficznym. Konkretne różnice istniejące między humorem polskim i brytyjskim, zaprezentowane w artykule, wyróżniono w oparciu o wyniki badań własnych, w których wzięły udział dwie grupy respondentów – Polacy (studenci), znający język angielski, oraz rodzimi użytkownicy języka angielskiego, mieszkający od co najmniej kilku lat w Polsce. Wyniki badań wskazują, że pomimo podobieństw istniejących między badanymi grupami (np. bardzo dobra znajomość języka angielskiego i kultury anglosaskiej przez polskich respondentów oraz znajomość kultury polskiej przez respondentów-obcokrajowców) można zaobserwować zasad-