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## United Germany in the global security system

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### **The concepts of security policy in reunited Germany**

Germany's unification treaties '2+4' granted its people complete sovereignty. Since then they have been fully independent as for decisions concerning their policies and cannot hide behind their western allies<sup>1</sup>. Many countries were hesitant about the new Germany and its enlarged territorial, demographic, economic and military potential. There were fears that influenced by the sense of increased power and pride, Germany might yet again take the path of militarism and expansionism<sup>2</sup>. Once again appeared the fear of German's vulnerability to aggressive nationalism<sup>3</sup>. And the fears were not completely unfounded as many statements issued by some right-wing politicians included postulates of the right to regain lost territories, and the issue of increasing the role and importance of Germany in the European as well as world security system was brought up on a daily basis. In the language of German politics re-appeared the

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<sup>1</sup> K. Longhurst, *German and the Use of Force. The Evolution of German Security Policy*, Manchester 2004, s. 19–31.

<sup>2</sup> One of the conditions for the reunification of Germany was to guarantee the inviolability of borders. Zob. Z. Zieliński, *Niemcy. Zarys dziejów*, Kraków 1998, s. 311.

<sup>3</sup> H. Schulze, *Niemcy. Nowa historia*, [tł. K. Jachimczak], Kraków 1999, s. 203.

words like power and domination<sup>4</sup>. The situation was additionally complicated by the fact that some countries, like the USA itself, actually expected Germany to get more involved on the international scene. The number of routes for Germans to follow then was practically unlimited.

Scholarly literature offered three most probable scenarios of the development of German security policy, i.e. the concepts of *Großmacht*, *Mittelmacht* and *Zivilmacht*. The concept of *Großmacht* assumed the twilight of the Euro-Atlantic era and the creation of a mighty German word power with its unquestionably dominant position in Europe, or even one aspiring to take the key position on the international political scene. According to this scheme, the collapse of the bloc system brought to an end the transatlantic epoch, and Germany as its most characteristic creation was relieved from limits resulting from the international situation and can now develop freely aiming at achieving the position of a word power, which was impossible during the Cold War<sup>5</sup>. As Timothy G. Ash wrote, after unification Germany became a power in the heart of Europe<sup>6</sup>. Besides, Germany are now the main potential candidate to the chair of permanent member of enlarged United Nations Security (UNSC).

Moreover, according to the concept of *Großmacht*, the German politics was to be exercised from the position of power. Such politics seems extremely disadvantageous for the image of Germany which went down disgracefully in the history of the first half of the XXth century. However, some arguments appeared which might have justified the policy of force. Namely, only by using force is it possible to face the world evil. In the fight against Hitlerism the allies won because they reacted with force against aggression. Otherwise, they

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<sup>4</sup> H. Dmochowska, *Międzynarodowa pozycja Niemiec na początku XXI w.*, [w:] *Zjednoczone Niemcy. Bilans przemian społecznych, ekonomicznych i politycznych (1990–2002)*, red. P. Kalka, J. Kiwerska, Poznań 2004, s. 397.

<sup>5</sup> G. Schöllgen, *Der Auftritt. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne*. München 2003, s. 133.

<sup>6</sup> T.G. Ash, *W imieniu Europy. Niemcy i podzielony kontynent*, [tł. S. Kowalski], Londyn 1996, s. 430.

would have been unable to defeat the Nazis. Similarly now, only force and determination to act can overcome new threats.

The first significant sign that Germany might in fact follow the route set by the concept of *Großmacht* was its unexpected and independent decision to recognize the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia. Additionally, Germany exerted various means of pressure aimed at making other countries recognize the newly established republics, too. Germany was strongly criticized for that and accused of actually sparking off the war in Yugoslavia. Since the Balkans had for centuries been one of the targets of German expansion, there appeared some fears that it was the first step to the renewal of the influence zone in the region lost for years.

Another factor which could suggest that Germany was getting closer to the concept of *Großmacht* was gradual but relatively fast evolution of its attitude towards the 'out of area' operations. Much as the German government struggled in 1990/91 to avoid military involvement in the planned operation against Iraq, in 1999 Luftwaffe planes took part in peace enforcement combat missions against Serb troops. In the course of time, Germany was abandoning the policy of the 'chequebook', i.e. co-financing the allies' military actions, and moving towards active involvement in the conducted missions by sending Bundeswehr troops to various parts of the world.

What confirmed Germany's desire to increase its importance in the international politics was its attitude to the latest Iraqi crisis. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder was the first to breach the antiterrorist coalition by denying the possibility of Bundeswehr troops taking part in the war against Iraq<sup>7</sup>. There is a lot of evidence that the objection was caused not so much by an analysis of the international situation, but by the wish to demonstrate independence from the USA<sup>8</sup>. Besides, the decision was taken without any consultation with other countries which was against all the deeply rooted and favourable multilateral actions.

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<sup>7</sup> J.M. Nowakowski, *Umierać za Bagdad?*, „Wprost” 2002, nr 36, s. 92.

<sup>8</sup> S. Szabo, *Germany and the United States after Iraq: From Alliance to Alignment*, „Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft” 2004, No. 1, 38–43.

The next option, *Zivilmacht*, shows Germany as a civil power, in contrast to the military power, and bases foreign policy on Europe. Europe should with time become a world power comparable to the US, which 70% of Germans wanted<sup>9</sup>. The FRG as the mightiest European power must play the crucial or even leading role in the process of building strong Europe. The purpose of strengthening the position of Germany on the international scene would be not so much boosting the prestige of the country, but a desire to stabilize international relations. Stabilization actions would be carried out by means of cooperation with other countries, in accordance with the law and international regulations, and avoiding violence and pressure if possible<sup>10</sup>.

The concept does not additionally anticipate the reversal from the ally across the Atlantic, but a change in the mutual relations. Europe and the US are supposed to be equal partners and make common efforts to improve the quality of the world security system, which was already included in the White Paper on Security Policy in 1994 as one of the basic German interests<sup>11</sup>. The German elites were tied to the Western democratic values and the main German political parties gave assurances in a sensible foreign policy based on cooperation with European allies<sup>12</sup>. As Margaret Thatcher wrote in her memories, Germany feared to govern themselves and therefore wanted to strengthen the European system<sup>13</sup>. The involvement of Germany in the implementation process of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) is remarkable. Germany is actually the main initiator stimulating the other countries to reform the mecha-

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<sup>9</sup> P. Buras, *Dokąd prowadzi „niemiecka droga”? O polityce zagranicznej Niemiec 2001–2004*, Wrocław 2005, s. 44–45

<sup>10</sup> H. Maull, *Zivilmacht Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Vierzehn Thesen für eine neue deutsche Aussenpolitik*, „Europa-Archiv” 1990, No. 10, s. 147.

<sup>11</sup> *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, Bonn 1994, s. 42–44.

<sup>12</sup> J. Kiwerska, *Uwarunkowania polityki zagranicznej zjednoczonych Niemiec*, [w:] *Zjednoczone Niemcy...*, Poznań 2004, s. 213.

<sup>13</sup> S. Sulowski, *Polityka europejska Republiki Federalnej Niemiec*, Warszawa 2004, s. 71.

nisms of the European security system<sup>14</sup>. When implementing new projects, Germany cooperates most closely with France which is also anxious about the increased importance of Europe on the international stage. Initially, German politicians watched carefully to make sure that the development of European security structures did not weaken the position of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or have negative influence on relations with the United States. However, the Bush's policy motivated Germany even more to strengthen the European defence component but the lack of military effectiveness is one of the central problems in transatlantic relations<sup>15</sup>. Anyway, Germany's involvement in the process of European integration is the key to good relations with neighbors<sup>16</sup>.

The directions of actions taken by German governments after 1990 referred to the concept in many aspects. However, they were more of a supplement of the general strategy. During particular conflicts, the authorities in Berlin put a heavy emphasis on diplomatic steps. Several times the Bundeswehr set out to war, but simultaneously another way of solving a conflict was sought. For example, Germany became heavily involved in the peace process in the Balkans. Besides, after the conflict was brought to an end, it sent a substantial civilian and military contingent whose purpose was to ensure that the peace accords were observed and tasked with helping to stabilize and rebuild the region. In 1998, the Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher promoted the idea of resignation by the NATO from so-called first nuclear strike, which resulted in criticism from allies<sup>17</sup>. During preparations for the war in Afghanistan, Germany clearly emphasized its readiness to take part in the Alliance's actions provided the US presented a constructive plan to combat terrorism that would

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<sup>14</sup> For more information on Germany's involvement in the implementation of the concept of European Security and Defence Identity: M. Kosman, *Zjednoczone Niemcy w procesie integracji europejskiej (1990–2002)*, Toruń 2004, s. 54–85.

<sup>15</sup> Kersten D. Voigt, *Crisis or Cooperation? The Transatlantic Relationship at a Watershed*, [w:] *Americanization and Anti-Americanism. The German Encounter with American Culture after 1945*, ed. A. Stephan, New York 2005, s. 253.

<sup>16</sup> A. Watson, *Niemcy. Kim są teraz?*, Poznań 1998, s. 317.

<sup>17</sup> K. Malinowski, *Polityka rządu Gerharda Schrödera wobec Polski 1998–1999*, „Zeszyty Instytutu Zachodniego” 2000, nr 15, s. 24–25.

serve a broader concept of making peace. Persuading the allies to hold the peace conference devoted to the future of Afghanistan, in Petersberg near Bonn on 27 November 2001, was a great diplomatic success which added to the image of Germany as a country that wished for stabilizing the situation in the world by peaceful means<sup>18</sup>.

Mittelmacht, the last of the main concepts, assumes that the policy based on the US will be continued. The concept results from the premise that Germany is no world power whatsoever, but only an average state. Similarly, in the whole Europe no country is strong enough to lead all the other countries<sup>19</sup>. Europe is too frail, moreover, it is haunted by misunderstandings and conflicting interests, unable to act effectively on the international stage. The anticipated expansion of the European Union will further intensify discrepancies within the Organization. Only the United States are strong enough to play the leading role for the western world and thus it is necessary to maintain the best possible relationship with the ally over the ocean. On the other hand, the United States see in the development of the German armed forces significant factor in strengthening European and global security<sup>20</sup>.

Initially, the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU)/Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e.V (CSU) – Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) coalition tried to avoid military cooperation with the US, but this was done for pragmatic reasons, not ideological ones. The German government strongly emphasized the role of the USA in Europe and the importance of its cooperation with the ally across the Atlantic<sup>21</sup>. Besides, with the passing of years the extent of Bundeswehr's participation in international operations, including those organized within NATO, increased significantly. The Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the Greens, that came to

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<sup>18</sup> A. Krzemiński, *Moc mocarstw*, „Polityka” 2001, nr 49, s. 34.

<sup>19</sup> A. Baring, *Einsame Mittelmacht. Ohne die USA gibt es keine Zukunft für Deutschland*, „Internationale Politik” 2003, nr 12, s. 55–56.

<sup>20</sup> A. Watson, *Niemcy. Kim są...*, s. 337.

<sup>21</sup> Ch. Hacke, *Weltmacht wider Willen. Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Frankfurt am Main 1993, s. 518.

power in 1998, actually seemed to present a more equivocal attitude to their transatlantic ally. The coalition agreement included notes on the crucial role of NATO and the United States for the security of Germany, Europe and the world<sup>22</sup>. What came as a surprise was the participation together with Americans in the bombardment of Bosnian Serbs. However, Germans were more reluctant to send their troops to Afghanistan, to a war with the country against which George Bush organized an antiterrorist coalition. Germany also opposed with grim determination another American war initiative, this time against Iraq, and aimed at paralysing the actions of the superpower which remarkably exacerbated transatlantic relations. Nevertheless, the Chancellor, Angela Merkel, realizes in practice declared need for improving relations with the United States.

All the examples presented above show that trends of the German security policy are not specified yet and undergo frequent changes<sup>23</sup>. It cannot be fully identified with any of the above models either. When analysing the security policy of the united Germany, except some invariable priorities like close links with the western structures, it is impossible to notice a clearly defined strategy that Germany would consistently follow. The security policy has always been developed in the normal course depending on the international situation. It is strongly influenced by the leaders of the ruling parties who make key decisions on that matter. German security policy depends greatly on what political faction is currently in power. However, political moods prevailing in the German society also have a considerable influence on the decision-makers.

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<sup>22</sup> Heinrich Böll Stiftung (online), [http://www.boell.de/downloads/stiftung/1998\\_Koalitionsvertrag.pdf](http://www.boell.de/downloads/stiftung/1998_Koalitionsvertrag.pdf), *Aufbruch und Erneuerung. Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der SPD und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen*, Bonn, 20 października 1998, s. 45–46.

<sup>23</sup> Ch. Hacke, *Weltmacht wider...*, s. 620–621.

### **The reform of Bundeswehr and the international armament commitments**

In terms of the military, the major problem that Germany faced during the unification process was integrating the National People's Army (NPA) with the Bundeswehr. Even in May 1990, the commander in chief of the NPA, admiral Theodor Hoffmann strongly emphasized the attachment to the Warsaw Pact and the necessity of its further strengthening as a military-political alliance<sup>24</sup>. A vast majority of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED) leadership and the generals were also convinced that NPA should exist as a separate army. They believed that the NPA, as a neutral partner, should play the role of a link between the East and the West. Such a situation was obviously unacceptable for the authorities in Bonn<sup>25</sup>.

Another problem was whether the Soviet Union would agree to further German membership in the NATO or demand the neutralization of the country. In June 1990 in the Caucasus, there was a meeting between the Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Michail Gorbachov. The Soviet leader gave his consent to the United Germany's membership in the NATO. However, it was not an unconditional permission. Germany was obliged to reduce the number of its troops from 667 thousand to 375 thousand. It also accepted a ban on deploying foreign troops on the territory of the former German Democratic Republic (Deutsche Demokratische Republik – DDR) until the Russian troops withdrew from there, as well as locating there weapon of mass destruction<sup>26</sup>.

After difficult negotiations the problem of the NPA's functioning was resolved. A decision was made that the NPA would be dissolved and only then new formations of the Bundeswehr would be created from the disbanded units. Immediately after the country was united, the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesrepublik Deutschland –

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<sup>24</sup> J. Schönbohm., *Zwei Armeen und ein Vaterland*, Berlin 1992, s. 25.

<sup>25</sup> J. Solak, *Niemcy w NATO*, Warszawa 1999, s. 233–234.

<sup>26</sup> J. Kiwerska, *Niemcy w Sojuszu Atlantyckim*, [w:] *Zjednoczone Niemcy...*, red. P. Kalka, J. Kiwerska, Poznań 2004, s. 215.



BD) Minister of Defence took over the supervision of the DDR troops. The Command of the Armed Forces 'East' was established to temporarily manage the human and material resources of the liquidated NPA. It functioned until 1 July 1991.

A basic problem was reducing the number of personnel of the German army. It was decided that in the western lands 77 thousand soldiers would be dismissed, among them 25 thousand professional soldiers and non-commissioned officers. The National People's Army was supposed to be a subject of even more significant reductions. While it was still functioning, the number of its personnel was seriously limited from 170 to 90 thousand. 55 thousand of them were officers and servicemen and the rest were civilian workers. The target number in the Bundeswehr in the new lands was set at 50 thousand, 20 thousand of whom were to come from the dissolved NPA units, 5 thousand from western lands and 25 thousand from mandatory military service<sup>27</sup>.

Another problem was how troops from the former NPA would find their feet in the structures of the Bundeswehr which were organised and managed in a completely different way. The question arose whether soldiers who were indoctrinated for years by the communist propaganda about the hostile western imperialists would be able to break with the SED past. Soldiers from the former NPA units underwent special trainings compliant with methods well-practised by the Bundeswehr for years. Additionally, they had to be in internship for two years and only then were they allowed to become rightful members of the Bundeswehr<sup>28</sup>. Some accusations appeared of discrimination when appointing people to command posts. However, officers coming from the east returned to their homeland units after the training in the west and they re-took their command posts.

There were fears that the dissolved NPA units might revolt which could remarkably destabilise the situation and make the integration process of the country more difficult. In order to prevent this from

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<sup>27</sup> J. Solak, *Niemcy w...*, s. 238.

<sup>28</sup> J. Schönbohm, *Niemcy przyszli do Niemców*, [w:] *W służbie pokoju. Bundeswehra 1955–1993*, red. H.A. Jacobsen, L. Souchon, [tłum. C.E. Król, D. Luliński, P. Seydak], Warszawa 1993, s. 110.

happening, numerous projects were launched aimed at creating new prospects for soldiers who were not given a post in the Bundeswehr. A new, highly favourable early retirement programme was prepared, and many retraining and further education courses were organised for younger demobilized soldiers which was taken advantage of by over 12 thousand people. Fortunately, no revolts occurred on the whole territory of the former DDR and the process of reducing the number of army employees ran according to plan.

Another important issue in the process of reforming the Bundeswehr was the reduction of military equipment. After the unification, its stock increased by 2300 tanks, 9000 armoured personnel carriers, 5000 artillery systems, 440 combat aircraft, 80 helicopters, 60 troop carriers, 192 battleships and other vessels, 1200 thousand handguns, 295 thousand tons of ammunition and 85 thousand vehicles<sup>29</sup>. According to the Moscow Pact, the BD's military potential after the unification could not increase. Besides, the issue concerning the amount of armament was also settled by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) setting the limits on armament<sup>30</sup>. In connection to that, Germany had to get rid of a significant amount of weapons, including 11 thousand items of heavy equipment. Initially, there appeared ideas to sell it or hand it over to other countries as aid, which took place for example during the Persian Gulf War. Later, the decision was made to have it utilized.

The regulation of the German Minister of Defence of 26 November 1992 'Political and defence guidelines' outlined the priorities of new Bundeswehr's actions, like country defence, stabilisation and integration in Europe, actions in aid of world peace, participation in rescue and humanitarian operations. In order for the aims to be successfully reached it was necessary to reorganise the army. The concept of the new Bundeswehr divided the armed forces into three categories, i.e. the main defence forces, crisis reaction forces and

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<sup>29</sup> *Weißbuch zur Sicherheit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die Zukunft der Bundeswehr*, Bonn 1994, s. 17.

<sup>30</sup> W. Multan, *Traktat w sprawie zbrojeń konwencjonalnych*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 1991, nr 3, s. 7–22.

basic military organisation<sup>31</sup>. The main defence forces constitute the core ensuring German security. In peace, the forces are subject to normal mobilization procedures and consist of professional soldiers. The crisis reaction forces comprise special high readiness forces meant for establishing the first defence lines against an attack on the country or any another NATO ally, as well as taking part in UN missions. Whereas the basic military organisation constitutes the logistic and sanitary support.

Simultaneously, command centres began to be reorganised. During the Cold War, the Bundeswehr did not have the general staff. Thus, it was completely unable to conduct independent action and was dependent on cooperation within NATO. In 1994 in Koblenz, the Land Forces Headquarters was created tasked with commanding the land forces during peacetime as well as coordinating 'out-of-area' operations of land, air and naval forces. The Land Forces Headquarters was a substitute of the general staff and it allowed the Bundeswehr to conduct independent combat actions<sup>32</sup>.

On the 1 January 1996, the special forces command, 'Kommando Spezialkräfte', was brought into being. The deadline set for the full formation of the special forces was 2001, and the number of soldiers was fixed at 960. The units made up of special task force commandos, airborne, reconnaissance and support troops are highly trained and superbly equipped<sup>33</sup>. Currently in the German special forces serve 1100 soldiers<sup>34</sup>.

Discussions have been led in the last several years over the possibility of making the army entirely professional. Opponents of the project argue that a professional army with the strength of e.g. 100

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<sup>31</sup> R. Baumgärtel, *Bundeswehra w okresie przelomu (1992–1993)*, [w:] *W służbie pokoju...*, red. H.A. Jacobsen, L. Souchon, Warszawa 1993, s. 84.

<sup>32</sup> W. Znajdziński, *Siły zbrojne Niemiec. Nowa koncepcja struktury Bundeswehry*, „Polityka Bezpieczeństwa i Siły Zbrojne Niemiec” 1995, nr 1, s. 58.

<sup>33</sup> In Germany there is also an antiterrorist special police unit „Grenzschutzgruppe 9”, which supports police and military actions abroad. The unit is considered as one of the best in the world. Zob. Grenzschutzgruppe 9 (online), [http://www.gsg9.de/cms/front\\_content.php?idart=76](http://www.gsg9.de/cms/front_content.php?idart=76), *GSG 9 – Kameradschaft e. V.*

<sup>34</sup> Kommando Spezialkräfte (online), <http://www.deutschesheer.de/portal/a/dso/dienststellen/ksk>, *Dienststellen. Kommando Spezialkräfte.*

thousand soldiers will not be a serious ally for the United States and it will weaken the country's position in the European and global politics. Its supporters, on the other hand, point out that in order for the Bundeswehr to carry out its basic tasks, i.e. stabilisation and peace-enforcement missions in different parts of the world, it is necessary to have highly trained and well-equipped soldiers, and not conscripts<sup>35</sup>. An important argument is also a significant burden imposed on the national budget which has to keep conscripts. Besides, they emphasised the fiction of the mandatory service since, for example, in 1998, 170 thousand conscripts applied for alternative military service and being granted is just a formality<sup>36</sup>. In 1996, the term of the mandatory military service was reduced from 12 to 10 months.

A significant problem in the process of reforming the Bundeswehr are insufficient financial resources allotted to the army which, instead of increasing, are being cut down. In 1990, the budget of the Ministry of National Defence was 57,5 billion DM (18 % of national budget), while in 1994 it was 47,2 billion DM (10 % of national budget)<sup>37</sup>. In 1998 it grew up to 48,4 billion DM, however, only in 1999 the 'Sparpaket' of the SPD/the Greens coalition reduced it to 45,3 billion DM. Due to the fact that the country is heavily indebted, also the government headed by Angela Merkel is making further budget cuts which do not omit the defence department. In 2007 the budget was 24,8 billion Euro. Already in 1998 Germany fell down to 17th position of the 19 NATO countries in terms of defence spending. Budget cuts prolonged huge investments in the modernisation of Leopards 2A6, the purchase of Tiger helicopters, Eurofighter 2000/

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<sup>35</sup> T. Cymek, *Ponadnarodowe uwarunkowania reformy niemieckich sił zbrojnych*, [w:] *Bezpieczeństwo państw i narodów w procesie integracji europejskiej*, red. W. Śmiałek, J. Tymanowski, Toruń 2002, s. 97.

<sup>36</sup> P. Piskorski, *Bundeswehra*, [w:] *Współczesne Niemcy*, red. K.A. Wojtaszczyk, Warszawa 1999, s. 245.

<sup>37</sup> T. Nowak, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa*, [w:] *System polityczny Republiki Federalnej Niemiec. Wybrane problemy*, red. S. Sulowski, K.A. Wojtaszczyk, Warszawa 2005, s. 281.

EFA fighter bombers, building GTK personnel carriers, frigates F-123 and F-124 or the U-212 submarine.

In May 2003 The Ministry of National Defence announced the 'Defence policy guidelines' which confirm that potentially the Bundeswehr can intervene in any region of the world. With regard to that until 2010 the structure of the army is to be divided into three types of military formations: the intervention forces, the stabilisation forces and the support forces. The intervention forces are to comprise a 35-thousand strong contingent of superbly equipped soldiers meant to deploy on peace-enforcement missions outside the NATO territory. The stabilisation forces, with the strength of 70 thousand, will participate in 'out-of-area' operations, but only in order to uphold peace. The 137,5-thousand strong support forces will be the back-up and support of the defence. The army is to be reduced to 250 thousand soldiers 195 thousand of whom will be regulars and temporary-career volunteers and 55 thousand will be conscripts<sup>38</sup>. Currently Bundeswehr has 247,100 active troops. Of these 188,112 are professional soldiers, 25,566 18–25-year-old conscripts who serve for at least nine months under current laws, and 33,417 Volunteer conscripts serving a longer military service. In addition the Bundeswehr has approximately 350,000 reserve personnel<sup>39</sup>.

The process of German unification, due to treaty limitations, did not cause increase either in the Bundeswehr's personnel or equipment. Regardless of that, the allies' expectations in terms of German Army's participation in peace operations in Europe and the world grew. In order for Germany to meet the international commitments concerning security it is necessary to constantly introduce organisational changes and, first of all, to increase expenditures for the army, and thus, modernize its equipment faster. In order to stop the military-technological gap between the USA and Europe from widen-

<sup>38</sup> Piotr Buras, *Dokąd prowadzi...*, s. 23.

<sup>39</sup> Die Bundeswehr (online), [http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/kcxml/04\\_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y\\_QjzKLd443cTQCSYGYxgEh-pEwsaCUVH1fj\\_zcVH1v\\_QD9gtyIckdHRUUATi3qcg!/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQU-MvNEIVRS82X0NfNENM](http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLd443cTQCSYGYxgEh-pEwsaCUVH1fj_zcVH1v_QD9gtyIckdHRUUATi3qcg!/delta/base64xml/L3dJdyEvd0ZNQUFzQU-MvNEIVRS82X0NfNENM), *Die Stärke der Streitkräfte*, 22 kwietnia 2010.

ing, it is necessary to drastically reform the financing policies of the European armies, among them – the Bundeswehr which plays one of the key roles on the European continent.

### **'Out-of-area' operations**

The Bundeswehr's activity outside the territory of the North-Atlantic Alliance sparks a lot of controversy in the German public. Its roots may go back to the German history, especially the experiences of the 2nd World War. The united Germany, as the greatest European power, was faced with the basic question about the role it should play in the European and world security system. On the one hand, the allies started to put pressure to make Germany involve more actively in the process of restoring order and security in the world. On the other hand, there appeared stronger public and political resistance of the left wing (mainly the SPD and the Greens) as well as fear of using force<sup>40</sup>.

The first test that the united Germany was put to was the Iraqi crisis. Chancellor Helmut Kohl flatly rejected the possibility of Germany taking part in the 'Desert Storm' operation. He justified it on the grounds of constitutional limitations for the Bundeswehr's actions exclusively to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, i.e. using its troops only on the occasion when one of the NATO members is attacked<sup>41</sup>. When making the decision, Kohl took into consideration not only public resistance, but he also feared the possibility of the Soviet Union suspending the ratification process of the unification treaties 2+4. Western allies, and especially the United States, found the decision selfish and at the same time, disturbingly independent which might have suggested the beginning of a new path in the German foreign policy.

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<sup>40</sup> M. Stürmer, *Die Grenzen der Macht, Begegnungen der Deutschen mit der Geschichte*, Berlin 1992, s. 10.

<sup>41</sup> M. Kosman, *Zjednoczone Niemcy...*, s. 61–62.

In order to ease American rancour, the German government made some concessions by sending a 3020-soldier-strong contingent that was kept far from the front line<sup>42</sup>. In March 1991, at the request of the UNSC, it deployed 5 battleships to the Persian Gulf. Despite the fact that the troops carried out military operations, officially they worked as 'humanitarian relief for the region'. Simultaneously, Germany conducted real humanitarian missions, e.g. in June 1991 they sent two thousand soldiers to attend to the 'airlift' in Turkey and Northern Iraq which supplied food and medicines to fleeing Kurds and Iraqi Shiites<sup>43</sup>. Apart from that, Germany pursued the 'foreign policy of a chequebook' on a vast scale by providing substantial funds and enormous amounts of equipment as well as sparing its logistic infrastructure for the military actions carried out in Iraq. The FRG's financial support for the operations in Iraq is estimated at as much as the colossal sum of 17 billion dollars<sup>44</sup>.

A key role in the evolution of the German security policy was played by Volker Rühle who, in April 1992, was nominated to the post of Minister of Defence. His policy was called the 'salami tactics'<sup>45</sup> because by taking small steps he accustomed the society to an increasing involvement of German troops in various kinds of missions. In the spring of 1992, a German military contingent established a field hospital in the war-torn Cambodia<sup>46</sup>. In summer, the Bundeswehr participated in United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), in the former Yugoslavia, where by means of an airlift Luftwaffe planes organised transport to the besieged Sarajevo, reconnaissance planes of the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) with German crews supervised the observance of the flight-exclusion zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Bundesmarine

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<sup>42</sup> T. Nowak, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa*, [w:] *System polityczny...*, s. 282.

<sup>43</sup> W. Pięciak, *Niemcy. Droga do normalności. Polityka zagraniczna RFN od wojny o Kuwejt do wojny o Kosowo*, Warszawa 2000, s. 79.

<sup>44</sup> K. Malinowski, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa koalicji SPD/Sojusz 90/Zieloni 90*, „Przegląd Zachodni” 2002, nr 4, s. 38.

<sup>45</sup> The name borrowed from the tactics of the communist takeover in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the Second World War aptly called by hungarian communist Mátyás Rákosi.

<sup>46</sup> T. Nowak, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa...*, Warszawa 2005, s. 284–285.

battleships took part in the NATO and Western European Union (WEU) initiated sea blockade of arms supplies on the Adriatic Sea. In the summer of 1993, 1700 Bundeswehr soldiers supported UN troops delivering food aid to Somalia which was the first ordinary German operation carried out by the 'Blue Helmets'<sup>47</sup>.

The issue of the legal possibilities of German troops' participation in 'out-of-area' operations was frequently on the agenda. Until German unification jurists and politicians have argued that the Constitution forbids the German armed forces to participate in humanitarian missions abroad<sup>48</sup>. The SPD accused the government that the actions undertaken in former Yugoslavia are against the law and unconstitutional. It was of the same opinion on the subsequent mission in Somalia. The dispute was finally settled by the Constitutional Tribunal which on 12 July 1994 passed a ruling concerning the participation of the German army in military operations. The Tribunal ruled that the Constitution allows the Bundeswehr to take part in operations conducted outside the territory of Germany and the NATO, but only provided the operations are conducted by international organisations. By speaking of international organisations, the Tribunal did not mean only the UN but it widened the range to all those whose at least one aim is ensuring collective security, like the NATO or EU. However, it did not specify whether the organisations must have a UN mandate to conduct such missions. Additionally, the Tribunal accepted as permissible the participation in combat missions, thus not only in humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations but also in peace-enforcement missions. This requires a simple majority of votes in Bundestag<sup>49</sup>.

The Constitutional Tribunal ruling changed the situation radically. Since that time, Kohl's government could rather easily make a decision to send troop abroad without exposing themselves to the opposition's criticisms for lawlessness of their actions. Besides, the government had little difficulty getting consent for such actions as

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<sup>47</sup> P.E. Quint, *The Imperfect Union. Constitutional Structures of German Unification*, New Jersey 2003, s. 292.

<sup>48</sup> S. Sulowski, *Polityka europejska...*, s. 59.

<sup>49</sup> J. Solak, *Niemcy w...*, s. 254.



it directly made the decision on that matter, which later required only the simple majority of votes in the Bundestag. The Tribunal's ruling ended the 'chequebook policy' stage.

In the existing situation, the Bundeswehr could freely get involved in the Balkan conflict. On 30 June 1995, the Bundestag voted to send Luftwaffe planes, and next military medical support units, to the conflict area. NATO actions proved very successful and forced the sides to negotiate<sup>50</sup>. The Dayton Peace Accord of 14 December 1995 received an observance guarantee in the form of UNSC's Resolution nr 1031 obliging the NATO to watch that the regulations are followed. The same year, multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) troops entered Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were replaced the following year by Stabilisation Force (SFOR) troops, including Bundeswehr soldiers.

After a victory in the Bundestag election in 1998, social democrats and the Greens came to power headed by Prime Minister Gerhard Schröder. The coalition of the SPD/the Greens was faced with a growing conflict in Kosovo. The Serb Army was taking increasingly drastic action against Kosovo Albanians. Slobodan Miloszević believed that air-raid threats issued against his troops were unlikely to be carried out. The dictator was confident that the left-wing German government would distance itself from participating in the air raids, which would lead to NATO's giving up entirely all the military actions in the region. Americans realised the role Germany played there and, for that reason, they demanded from them a clear statement confirming their readiness to take part in the operation. The new government fully realised that Germany's credibility as a NATO ally was at stake. That is why it appealed to the Bundestag to consider taking the decision to send 'Tornado' planes to Kosovo. The request was granted by the Bundestag on 16 October 1998. Such a course of action was surprising enough as the planned air raids on Serbs were not even authorised by UNSC.

The threat of air raids forced Miloszević to make concessions and start negotiations. Talks initiated at the beginning of 1999 did not

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<sup>50</sup> J. Kiwerska, *Uwarunkowania polityki...*, s. 231–232.

prove very successful and reprisals against Albanians increased again. In the face of such a situation, on 24 March 1999 the NATO began bombardments. Among a thousand aircraft used during the air raids only fourteen belonged to Luftwaffe. This modest military contribution had a considerable political significance as it demonstrated that NATO was capable of cooperating.

The air raids were stopped on 10 July 1999 due to Belgrade's concessions. UNSC issued a mandate to organise civilian and military forces tasked with peacekeeping in Kosovo. The tasks were taken on by Kosovo Force (KFOR) and United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Working within KFOR, Germany had the headquarters responsible for sector 'South Kosovo', with 7200 soldiers, 4700 of whom were Germans.

Subsequent 'out-of-area' operations in which German soldiers took part include for example the peace restoration operation in Eastern Timor, fighting to separate from Indonesia, which was conducted from October 1999 to February 2000, humanitarian relief for the flood victims in Mozambique in March 2000 and participating in the operation 'Essential Harvest' in Macedonia in 2001. The operation in Macedonia was aimed at disarming the insurgents of the Albanian minority striving for secession. The action, involving 500 Bundeswehr soldiers, is likely to have prevented further escalation of the conflict<sup>51</sup>.

Another difficult test that German politics was subjected to were terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on New York and Washington D.C. Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, like many other world leaders, declared full solidarity with the attacked United States and expressed his country's readiness to take part in the war. His declarations were promptly sanctioned at a summoned NATO meeting. As soon as 12 September in Brussels, despite no apparent enemy, members of the Treaty decided to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty<sup>52</sup>.

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<sup>51</sup> T. Nowak, *Polityka bezpieczeństwa...*, s. 282.

<sup>52</sup> A. Ciupiński, *Solidarność euroatlantycka w konfrontacji z terroryzmem*, „Wojsko i Wychowanie” 2002, nr 2, s. 100–106.

When emotions were released and it was time to debate the future intervention, some voices were heard in Germany claiming that attacking a sovereign country like Afghanistan was unacceptable if the aggressors were members of Al-Qaeda's terrorist network<sup>53</sup>. Besides, there was no convincing evidence that Usama ibn Ladin was behind the attacks. In order to win the Bundestag's decision to send Bundeswehr to Afghanistan, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder had to connect the voting with a motion for the vote of confidence. About 100 soldiers from German special forces took part in the operation 'Enduring Freedom'. The Bundeswehr's greater involvement has been noticeable in the organised since December 2002 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops watching over security in Afghanistan.

The attitude of the FRG government towards the possibility of participating in the campaign against Iraq was distinctly different. The German government was gradually distancing itself from the policy followed by George Bush who in his new strategic doctrine of September 2002 declared the admissibility of preventive attack on any country which might potentially threaten world peace. Having noticed a negative attitude towards Bush's policy within the coalition, Schröder started to criticise his moves openly and tried to block them in various ways both in front of the German public and in other European countries. Among others, together with France and Belgium he prevented the decision to allow NATO to protect Turkey from Hussein's retaliation actions in case of a war against Iraq. He also questioned the UN resolution of 11 November 2002 concerning the possibility of intervention in Iraq under the UN auspices in case the country breached its inspection obligations<sup>54</sup>.

At the beginning of 2007 almost 9 thousand Bundeswehr soldiers took part in various 'out-of-area' missions, 2844 of them in Kosovo, 2800 in Afghanistan and 1180 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the course of the several years since the unification, the activity of the German

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<sup>53</sup> J. Kiwerska, *Niemcy w Sojuszu...*, s. 239.

<sup>54</sup> K. Malinowski, *Konsekwencje kryzysu irackiego. Niemcy wobec nowego kształtu stosunków transatlantycznych*, „Zeszyty Instytutu Zachodniego” 2004, nr 34, s. 8–11.

troops and their involvement in international conflicts have increased significantly. German authorities consider each decision very carefully and the prevailing mood of public opinion is an essential factor for them. Besides, parallelly to military operations they always lead diplomatic actions. Germany is becoming less and less influenced by the pressure from other countries, mainly the USA, and it pursues a policy which is more and more independent though, at the same time, it seeks support for its decisions from the allies.

In July 2009, the Chancellor Angela Merkel has agreed to resign from the previously existing rules for the Bundeswehr to use force in Afghanistan only in self-defense. In February 2010 decided to send to Afghanistan other 850 soldiers, who will join 4,5 thousand already stationing in the country<sup>55</sup>. At the end of May 2010 the German president Horst Köhler has resigned after an unfortunate expression, suggesting that Germany might use its troops to protect trade routes<sup>56</sup>.

### **The historical burden and the pacifist movement**

Germany is a country which went down exceptionally badly in the recent chapter of history. The tragedy of the Second World War triggered off by the Third Reich is well-known all over the world. The Nazi savagery, total war or holocaust are events which not only should never be forgotten but ones which are impossible to forget. Despite all the evil done to Europe by Germans, their crimes have been forgiven. Western Germany was given another opportunity by Europe and pulled into the integration process. The chance was the same important for Germany and Europe because, if taken advan-

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<sup>55</sup> Money.pl (online), <http://news.money.pl/artykul/niemcy;maja;strategie;misji;w;afganistanie,85,0,585557.html>, A. Widzyk, *Niemcy mają strategię misji w Afganistanie*, 9 lutego 2010.

<sup>56</sup> „Rzeczpospolita” (online), [http://www.rp.pl/artykul/487850\\_K\\_hler\\_zaskoczyl\\_Niemcow.html](http://www.rp.pl/artykul/487850_K_hler_zaskoczyl_Niemcow.html), P. Jendroszczyk, *Prezydent Horst Köhler nieoczekiwanie ustąpił ze stanowiska oburzony krytyką pod jego adresem*, 31 maja 2010.

tage of, it was supposed to guarantee that similar events would never take place again.

In the times of the Bonn Republic, Western-German politicians were far from settlements by force, avoided participating in combat missions allowing only help for the suffering, war victims or natural disasters within humanitarian actions. In all that time, no German soldier lost his life in the battlefield. The society tried hard to forget about the atrocities of the Second World War. The leaders attempted to channel their foreign policy in such a way as to win back their European partners' trust and convince them that Germany would never enter a path similar to that marked out by Adolph Hitler years before. At the same time, the pacifist movement in Germany grew powerful and attempts to return to militarism met with bitter criticism. On the other hand Germany may not fall into the extremes, from the "power possessed" to the "fear of power"<sup>57</sup>.

The first serious trial that German politicians and society had to face was the Gulf conflict. Preparing for the war against Saddam Hussein's troops, the United States began to build a coalition<sup>58</sup>. Voices appeared that NATO should swing into the actions because after the collapse of the bloc system the Organisation's range of actions had to undergo changes. Still, when Americans turned to Germany for military assistance, they were sent away empty-handed. This time the decision was affected not so much by moral and historical reasons, but mainly by pragmatism and considering the conflict as a secondary issue compared with the central problems of the country's unification.

There were some speculations in Germany about high probability of Bundeswehr's participation in the operations against Iraqi troops. The news had an electrifying effect on the society. A survey conducted in 1990 showed that 75% of Germans supported the isolation of their country from any international conflicts. In the following surveys the same number of respondents opposed the possibility of

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<sup>57</sup> S. Sulowski, *Polityka europejska...*, s. 69.

<sup>58</sup> More about it in: J. Bullach, H. Morris, *Wojna Saddama. Początki konfliktu kuwejckiego i reakcja międzynarodowa*, Poznań 1991.

extending the international responsibility of Germany, and as many as 40% supported the idea of neutrality based on the Swiss model. When the war broke out at the beginning of 1991, a wave of mass protests and peace demonstrations spread through the whole Germany. It did not matter to the demonstrators that Hussein was to blame for the war as he invaded the sovereign country of Kuwait. Even the arguments of legitimation of the combat actions by the UNO or support received from the international public opinion were to no avail. The German public spoke against the coalition's actions and believed that it was done for the sake of preserving peace<sup>59</sup>.

In the following years, the government several times made the decision to send limited military contingents to conflict-affected regions, like Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina or Somalia. Although the Blue Helmets were supposed to conduct only humanitarian tasks of providing food or organising medical care, the authorities' moves met with fierce criticism. The opposition parties tried to block those actions by putting forward motions to the Constitutional Tribunal about their being unconstitutional. Whereas, the public differed considerably as to the question of Bundeswehr's participation in such undertakings.

At the beginning of the nineties, an all-out dispute arose over Bundeswehr's participation in out-of-area operations. Christian-democratic politicians believed that there was no need for Germany to follow again a special 'Sonderweg' path. They postulated abandoning excessive abstinence conditioned by historical experience. They were of the opinion that Germany, like any other sovereign state, should have the possibility to manage its own army independently and, if necessary, send it to a conflict area if they decide that a situation calls for it. Politicians gathered around the Minister of Defence Volker Rühle stressed that Germany should become more involved in actions aimed at stabilising and bringing back peace in the world and, thus, take more responsibility for the fate of the world.

Liberals from FDP, sharing political power with the CDU/CSU, believed that it would be advisable for Bundeswehr to take part in

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<sup>59</sup> J. Kiwerska, *Uwarunkowania polityki...*, s. 217–218.

important operations carried out under the auspices of the UNO and other international organisations, but only on the condition that such operations would have a mandate from the UNSC. They also claimed that in order to make such actions legal it was necessary to change the constitution<sup>60</sup>.

The opposition presented completely different views as, for them, the pacifist ideals played a much more significant role. SPD politicians brought complaints before the Constitutional Tribunal against the government claiming that the missions conducted by them in the Balkans and Somalia are unconstitutional. The Greens were even more sceptical about the participation of the Bundeswehr in missions outside the country. Their leader, Joschka Fischer, stated that Germany had fought too many wars in its history already. Although even the Greens, in the poll in 1991, recognized the independence of Slovenia and Croatia, they still did not accept the possibility of armed intervention in the defence of the newly established republics.

A surprising ruling by the Constitutional Tribunal about the 'out-of-area' operations being legal caused fears among pacifists that Germany might return to the long-forgotten path of militarism. The fears were more or less successfully dispelled by the politicians from the governing coalition. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, assured that Germany would stick to the restraint manner and every decision concerning the use of troops outside the state borders would be exposed to close scrutiny, while most of them would be negative.

The outrageous news coming from the Balkans shook the German public opinion. The 1995 Srebrenica massacre was not an isolated incident in the war waged there for years, however, the scale of this particular genocide made the whole Europe turn its eyes on the Balkans. In discussions, the killing was compared to the events from the Second World War. The ethnic cleansing, savagery or concentration camps were strikingly reminiscent of Nazi actions and they brought back sad memories of the holocaust. German pacifists were

<sup>60</sup> A.S. Markovits, S. Reich, *Das deutsche Dilemma, Die Berliner Republik zwischen Macht und Machtverzicht*, Berlin 1998, s. 238.

confronted with a major problem of whether the path they had chosen still seemed right in the face of such events. The situation showed that the values of pacifism, peace, human rights and the right to live followed by them were mutually exclusive. Abstaining from involvement against Serb troops' actions equalled a quiet consent for murdering thousands of innocent people.

The events in Srebrenica generated a heated discussion in the hard-line pacifist Green party. Their leader, Joschka Fischer, clearly admitted in his speeches that in the face of genocide it was impossible to remain passive. He observed that the world had to oppose this brutality and Germany could not be missed in the coalition against evil<sup>61</sup>. An opinion was becoming more and more popular among the left-wing elite, which years before had been the cause of similar evil, that Germany today was particularly obliged to counter the evil with steely determination<sup>62</sup>.

A few years later Germany was presented with an even bigger moral problem. The SPD/the Greens coalition had to make a decision whether to take part in the planned NATO-led air raids of Serb troops conducting extermination actions against Kosovo Albanians. The matter was especially complex because potential bombardments did not have a UNO mandate. Additionally, Belgrade which was one of the possible air-raid targets, was a rather troublesome place as its inhabitants still remembered vividly the raids of German bombers during the Second World War. Despite the fact that the decision to send the planes was so difficult, it was seconded by as many as 500 out of 560 Members of Parliament, many of them being staunch pacifists until short before. The majority of the German society also supported the Kosovo intervention.

After the terrorist attacks in the United States, Germans were faced with the question whether they were ready to fight for freedom and human rights across the world. Many social and political circles were reluctant to participate in yet another war, this time against

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<sup>61</sup> W. Pięciak, *Niemcy. Droga do...*, s. 118–119.

<sup>62</sup> B. Koszel, *Mitteleuropa rediviva? Europa Środkowo- i Południowo-Wschodnia w polityce zjednoczonych Niemiec*, Poznań 1999, s. 303.



the Afghan Taliban who were only indirectly responsible for the New York tragedy. Politicians gave consent to Bundeswehr's involvement in the operation 'Enduring Freedom' because the poll was connected with a motion of confidence vote for the government. When Americans were forming another coalition for yet another war, this time in Iraq, the German politicians objected strenuously, which was consistent with the moods prevailing in the nation. An aversion to the Iraqi war was visible on the streets of German towns from the very beginning. There were mass protests against Bush's policy due to increasing destabilisation of the country after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime. The German society, like most European nations, will not even hear of the possible American attack on yet another country, Iran.

### **Łukasz Jureńczyk**

#### **Zjednoczone Niemcy w globalnym systemie bezpieczeństwa**

Zjednoczone Niemcy stanęły przed koniecznością sformułowania kierunków polityki zagranicznej i, co szczególnie istotne dla sojuszników, polityki bezpieczeństwa. W sąsiednich państwach, między innymi w Polsce, pojawiły się obawy o ponowne wkroczenie Niemiec na drogę militarizmu i ekspansjonizmu. Obawy budził zwiększony potencjał terytorialny i demograficzny, a przede wszystkim ostateczne wyzwolenie się Niemiec z powojennych ograniczeń wynikających z umów między mocarstwami. Z drugiej strony sojusznicy, szczególnie Stany Zjednoczone, oczekiwali od Niemiec zaangażowania militarnego w stabilizowanie sytuacji na świecie. W literaturze przedmiotu badacze zarysowali trzy główne koncepcje dotyczące pozycji Niemiec w światowym systemie bezpieczeństwa, Großmacht, Mittelmacht i Zivilmacht. W praktyce kolejne rządy zjednoczonych Niemiec podejmowały decyzje, których znamiona są charakterystyczne dla wszystkich trzech koncepcji. Widoczna była jednak tendencja przejmowania przez Niemcy coraz większej odpowiedzialności za światowe bezpieczeństwo. Użycie siły zbrojnej każdorazowo poprzedzała jednak szczegółowa analiza i debata, w której coraz mniejsze znaczenie odgrywała historia Niemiec.