

DARIUSZ ŁUKASIEWICZ

Between Common Sense and Fantology

The main objective of this paper in part 1 and 2 is the analysis of two types of philosophy: commonsensical philosophy and fantology (anti-commonsensical philosophy).¹ In the subsequent part, I will present Edmund Husserl's view on the common sense world, and, finally, Tadeusz Czeżowski's views and will attempt to prove that the latter's position might be described as a middle way between common sense and fantology.

Philosophy of the Common Sense World and Commonsensical Philosophy

Considerations about the common sense world and common knowledge emerged in the European philosophy only in the seventeenth century thanks to George Berkeley, David Hume, and Thomas Reid. However, certain common knowledge problems such as metaphysical theses concerning the world and its relation to human beings had already occupied the ancient Greeks.²

The beliefs that there exists a world independent of human beings, and that this world is such as it is given to us in sensuous perceptions are philosophical theses occurring in different forms of philosophical realism. Perhaps Aristotle's philosophy is the best exemplification of such realistic metaphysics. If we take into account the so called "naïve physics" elaborated by Aristotle, i.e., the set of beliefs concerning the principles how the physical world around us works, then it is Aristotle who can be regarded as one of the first commonsensical philosophers, although not a philosopher of the common sense world. (Loux 2002, pp. 5-6) It also seems that the ontology of mind typical for the realistic philosophies ("naïve realism" as it is sometimes labeled or "folk psychology") has in principle a commonsensical character. Commonsensical realism teaches us that we are in direct contact with things themselves and not with any of their substitutes (contents,

representatives, symbols). Perhaps, various forms of medieval philosophies are good instantiations of commonsensical realism both in metaphysical and psychological form.³

Let us say that philosophies which share commonsensical beliefs concerning the world and ways our mind works are commonsensical. There is a clear difference between a commonsensical philosophy and philosophy of the common sense world. The philosophy of the common sense world is every philosophy (theory) which, as Gibson says, focuses on our everyday world (the world we live in), i.e., the world between atoms and galactics.⁴ Thomas Reid's philosophy is the philosophy of the common sense world, but it is also the commonsensical philosophy. However, it is well known that there are philosophies of the common sense world which are anti-commonsensical: they negate both (Berkeley) or one of the essential components of the commonsensical beliefs mentioned above. (Russell 1967, p. 8)⁵

Barry Smith, Peter Simons and Kevin Mulligan have recently stated that contemporary analytic philosophy (AP) is anti-commonsensical and reveals the attitude of *horror mundi*. They argue that AP is not interested in the real world (our common world included). The focus on the common world is replaced by intriguing philosophical puzzles whose solutions, however, are still missing, and meticulous studies over those riddles make no contributions into our knowledge about the real world (the common world included). Smith, Simons and Mulligan say that:

These problems include: paradigms, rules, family resemblance, criteria, "gavagai" Gettier, rigid designation, natural kinds, functionalism, eliminativism, truth-minimalism, narrow vs. wide content, possible worlds, externalism vs. internalism, vagueness, four-dimensionalism, and, just now, presentism. Although all the issues mentioned are genuinely philosophical ones, they are perused, still on the basis of the attitude of *horror mundi*, among practitioners of philosophy whose horizon extends little further than the latest issue of *Mind* or *The Journal of Philosophy*. ... The quickest way to a career in the competitive world of modern AP is to pick a puzzle in a trendy area — be it vagueness, modal counterparts, rigid designation, 'the hard problem' or the elimination of truth — and come up with a hitherto unsuspected twist in the dialectic, earning a few more citations in one or another of the on-going games of fashionable philosophical ping-pong. F(a)ntological philosophy triumphs, because elegantly structured possible worlds are so much more pleasant places to explore than the flesh and blood reality which surrounds us here on Earth. (Mulligan, Simons, Smith 2006, p. 3)

Thus, AP is dominated by "fantology" which manifests the attitude of *horror mundi*; fantology is not interested in the common sense world and it is not a commonsensical philosophy. True, such a diagnosis can be regarded

as an oversimplification because not all AP is anti-commonsensual and not all contemporary philosophy is analytic. However, it is also true that anti-commonsensual motifs are strong in AP and that the non-analytic philosophy lacks theoretical attitude. The French and German philosophy is rather practical (Deleuze, Guattarii, Habermas) and not theoretical; its field of interests being a social and political and not physical or biological world. (Mulligan, Simons, Smith 2006, p. 5)⁶

Fantology

The term “fantology” was invented by Barry Smith, and its root is the linguistic form taken from the language of first-order predicate logic: *Fa*. “*a*” stands for an individual entity and “*F*” stands for a universal entity. (Smith 2005, p. 156) First-order predicate logic embraces two types of denoting expressions: “*F*,” “*G*,” “*R*” and so on, and “*a*,” “*b*,” “*c*,” and hence the world has to contain two kinds of entities: universals (concepts, properties) and individuals (things). (Smith 2005, p. 153)⁷ Thus, predicate logic is a formal theory of the world, its exact scientific representation.⁸ Hence, fantology is to be the ontology of the world. Its forerunners were Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein. It was Russell who said that “logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology, though with more abstract and general features.” (Russell 1919, p. 169) Barry Smith himself treated fantology as a contemporary form of linguistic Kantianism; the structure of the world is determined by the language we use to speak about the world, and hence, in order to know the formal structure of the world it suffices to resort to the language of predicate logic because it is the best device of the world description which we have now. The fantological ontology also claims as well that the best way to represent complex entities in the world is set theory. The concept of relation can be also defined in terms of set theory as an ordered set of elements. However, sets are abstracts which do not exist in space and time; the set of natural numbers is the same type of abstract as the set of people living now in the world. Thus, fantology replaces the real world with the world of abstracts. Perhaps, in the context of fantology there is a hidden meta-ontological assumption that a good ontology should allow a reduction of a complex object to its simpler constituents, finally to simple entities, which are the lowest level of the real world. Therefore, fantology seems to be an atomistic and combinatorial ontology. The classic example of the fantological atomism is the Russellian theory of denotation of proper names, according to which such names denote sense data.⁹ Another fantological conception is a theory of monadic

predication which allows making predication irrespective of the nature of objects of which predication is about. Propositions: “John is wise” and “2 is an even number” are examples of the same type of predication which is completely insensitive as to the difference in nature between John and 2. This unambiguity of predication made it possible to build formally valid propositions, which contravene common sense, such as “The square root of Napoleon’s mother is the false.” (Constructed by Frege)

Next, in the fantological ontology there is no place for other properties than universals. The last fact is related to the rejection of Aristotle’s double predication: predication in the category of substance: “John is a human being” and predication in the category of accident: “John is hungry.” The theory of double predication opens a way to the ontology of tropes (individual properties) and to the enlargement of the ontological square proposed by Aristotle as follows:

	Substantial	Accidental
Universal	Second substance <i>man</i> <i>cat</i> <i>ox</i>	Second accident <i>headache</i> <i>sun-tan</i> <i>dread</i>
Particular	First substance <i>this man</i> <i>this cat</i> <i>this ox</i>	First accident <i>this headache</i> <i>this sun-tan</i> <i>this dread</i>

Based on Barry Smith (Smith 2005, p. 162)

The fantological ontology leaves no place for entities other than individuals (which are not Aristotle’s first substances) and universals (Aristotle’s second substances), hence there is no room for such entities as tropes (this headache, this Marry’s smile) or events and processes.

Armstrong’s “Spreadsheet Ontology” is a recently proclaimed manifest of the fantological belief in the ontological nature of the world. According to this ontology, as has been already said, the world is build of individuals (things) and universals (properties). Armstrong claims that if a future physics discovers all properties of each individual, then we (or subsequent generations) will have a complete knowledge about the world; all places in the table like the one below will be filled.

	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U	...
a			x			x			x	x	x						
b		x	x								x	x				x	
c		x	x										x	x	x		
d						x										x	
e	x					x						x				x	
f																	
g			x			x					x	x	x				
i			x			x	x			x				x	x	x	
j			x		x									x	x	x	
...																	

However, if the world is not composed only of individuals and universals — as fantology claims — but there are also entities postulated for example by common sense and naive physics, then, of course, even the completion of Armstrong’s table will not amount to the complete description of the world.¹⁰

The representation of the common sense world proposed by cognitive sciences (AI) could be a good example of an application of the fantological ontology. The sentence based on a normal perceptual experience “Calvin is in the living room” is analyzed, in, as Smith and Casati say, a “shamefacedly counter-commonsensical set-theoretic” way: “the set of spatial points making up the region occupied by Calvin is a subset of the set of points making up the living room.” (Davis 1990, p. 248)¹¹ That treatment of perception (and ontology of perception) amounts, in fact, to epistemological anti-realism since the object of perception is not the thing as it is, but mathematical abstracts (sets).

Thus, one may say the realization of Russell’s ideas according to which logic should deal with the real world led in some cases to the replacement of the real world by a world constructed by logic itself. And if scientific knowledge must abide by rigor of logic (a sufficiently rich logic able to represent the formal structure of the world), then scientific knowledge (at least part of it) can become a form of fantology.¹²

However, it would not be advisable to draw a hasty conclusion that predicate logic is completely incoherent with common sense knowledge and, therefore, should be rejected by someone looking for an adequate model of the common sense world.¹³

Husserl and the Common Sense World

Edmund Husserl can be counted as one of the classic theorist of the common sense world and his insights are still important for many searching

for more adequate knowledge of the common sense world. Let us present briefly the most essential of Husserl's intuitions concerning the common sense world and common knowledge.

The common sense world is given to us as the real world; "real" means here substantial, i.e. the world is composed of things (and not, for example, sense data or sets of sense data) connected by causal relations. Each change in the state of a thing is related to a change in the environment of a given thing.¹⁴ Things of the common sense world have their habits and behave in a typical way: similarly in similar circumstances. Therefore, the common sense world is ordered and has its own rules; a thing's behavior is predictable, and ordinary induction is the method of gaining knowledge about things. Things change in various ways but remain self-identical. Changes affect one and the same thing — we understand changeability this way in our common sense experience, and hence we do not conceive a thing as a sequence of phases but as a unity enduring in time. A thing given in a sensuous perception is a three dimensional entity possessing various features, but not all of them are given simultaneously. In Husserl's phenomenology every thing has aspects, sides and it is given in adumbrations; hence perception of a thing is never adequate and complete. There are always properties which we cannot perceive and we always perceive a given thing from a certain point of view. Therefore, in spite of the fact that it is always the thing itself which is perceived and not any substitute, the distinction between appearance and thing (reality) is known to the common sense view on perception. A thing may appear to be white, and in a different light the same thing may seem to be yellow. Yet, the difference in ways of presentation does not imply that the very thing changes, but only its appearances change. (Husserl 1952, pp. 61, 73)

Husserl and his followers are clear that things and their properties are not the only objects of perception; we perceive media (water, smoke, rain, mist), and holes as well. (Husserl 1973)

The most crucial point for the common sense perception described by the phenomenologists is that when we perceive a thing we perceive its sensuous qualities, but it is the thing itself as a unity and not its qualities or a set of qualities that we perceive. (Husserl 1952, p. 70)

The content of our everyday perception is composed not solely of inanimate things, but we perceive other people, plants and animals. They are all entities possessing (to a various extent) the ability to self-move and feel. The ability to experience and have mental states is bound with soul, which, as Husserl believes, is typical of common sense, is a factor animating body.¹⁵

Perceiving is one of the fundamental human activities in the world. On the one hand, common sense treats human perception as infallible in the

sense that there is a distinction between normal and abnormal perceptions, and there is no room for global skepticism in the commonsensical epistemology.¹⁶ On the other hand, perception is fallible in the sense that the cognitive results of perceptions can be revised or refuted in the future by other perceptions. Perception is asymmetrical in the sense that things around us, accessible for our sense organs, do not cause us to perceive them. Things can be accessible for perception and not be perceived, unless we pay our attention to them. However, some things in the field of our perceptual abilities can stand out above others and the most attractive things can motivate us to perceive them. Yet, motivation, is not causation: a thing in the field of our perception does not have to be perceived, but in normal circumstances a normal subject pays attention to the most attractive and outstanding things.¹⁷

Human being is not only a subject perceiving physical phenomena, but also a subject making valuations and acting in the world. Husserl and other phenomenologists speak about evaluations in terms of value-perceptions. (Husserl 1952, p. 156) Axiological perceptions build a cognitive ground for human acting in the world: we strive for positively evaluated ends and avoid negatively evaluated things.

From Husserl's common sense perspective, a human is not an agent acting in isolation in the world of physical entities, but a member of a certain society which has its own culture composed of habits, institutions, laws, moral principles, artifacts possessing functions, values and meaning. (Husserl 1952, §47) According to phenomenology, the common sense world (the ontological correlate of common knowledge) has different levels and it embraces entities belonging to distinct ontological categories: things, properties, persons, values, causes, motifs.

Thus, there are essential differences between the fantological (scientific) ontology of the common sense world depending on the language of standard predicate logic and the phenomenological ontology depending on perception (intuition). The latter is multi-layered, multi-categorical, non-atomistic and non-reductionistic (a thing is not a set of sensual qualities, perception is not a set of sense data, and the common world is not a combination of natural things). One of the most important assumptions of such non-atomistic ontology is a holistic conception of consciousness — the conception typical of Husserl, but also of other Brentanian philosophers.

Czeżowski¹⁸

Czeżowski's philosophy is a kind of logicism. The point here is that Czeżowski treated logic not only as a basic tool of philosophical analysis,

but as the necessary and sufficient condition of science: whatever is to be a science must have a logical structure (inferential nature), and logic is a theory of science or meta-science.¹⁹ Czeżowski, however, did not take over the Russellian belief that logic is simply a formal theory of the world. Czeżowski, similarly to Husserl, accepted a less radical view, namely, that logic is a theory of relations between propositions, and not a theory of things or relations between things in the world. Contrary to Husserl, however, Czeżowski thought that mathematical logic can and should be a basis for such a theory (ontology), but in order to deliver a “mathematical ontology” (Czeżowski’s name) it is necessary to interpret logic. Interpreting logic consists in the substitution of variables belonging to the language of a given logical theory by names of objects in the world (the operation of interpretation can be expressed in terms of fulfillment: logical variables are empty places which should be “fulfilled” by empirical data²⁰). The second step in the procedure of application logic to the world is the verification of the logical ontology.

Czeżowski was not only a logicist, but also a member of Brentano’s school, and this fact is reflected in his views as to how the common sense world should be articulated in a scientific and philosophical theory.

Let us review briefly the main Brentanian theses concerning perception which were shared by Czeżowski and which were relevant for the problem of commonsensical and scientific knowledge.

The Brentanian theory of perception is based on three assumptions: intentionalism, epistemological realism and holism. Intentionalism is the view that thought (mind) is directed towards an object (mind transcends itself).²¹ Epistemological realism is the view that it is the thing itself and not any of its substitutes (a sign, a symbol, an abstract, a content) which is the object of thought (intention), and the object which is given to the intentional mind is the object identical with the target of the intention, e.g. I am thinking about the table in my room and the table is the target of my intention, and not, say, a set of sensual qualities. The essential thesis of holism (the psychological view) is the unity of consciousness and a cognitive priority of a whole over its parts. The consequence of holism is that any complex mental experience is not simply a sum of its elements or a combination of psychological atoms, whatever they might be. Undoubtedly, Czeżowski’s psychological holism is grounded in *Gestaltpsychologie* which had been inspired and developed also by Brentanism (Ehrenfels).²² The Brentanian theory of perception can imply neither the conception of a thing as a set of sensibila or sense data, nor the conception of the world as a set of individuals represented in the language of set theory.

Contrary to fantology, a one or, at most, two-category ontology (individuals plus universal properties) could not be accepted by Czeżowski

because of his intentionalism. According to Czeżowski, there are two types of intentions: sensual and suprasensual intentions (axiological and conceptual).²³ In fact, the Czeżowskian intentionalism results in ontological pluralism: there are in the world surrounding us not only things and their properties, but also values.²⁴

Our common sense world is not only physical and natural, but it is also the world of culture. It was one of Czeżowski's most important metaphysical beliefs that there are axiological entities irreducible to any natural (accessible to sense organs) objects in the world.²⁵ Things are not only white or black, but they can also be good or bad, beautiful or ugly, as, in accordance with Czeżowski's approach, wrote another Polish philosopher, Władysław Tatarkiewicz when describing the natural (commonsensical) view of the world. (Tatarkiewicz 1986, p. 17) In other words, in a human normal cognitive activity there is a perception of values.

Czeżowski, like Tatarkiewicz and Husserl, wanted not only to preserve this axiological trait of the world in pre-philosophical thinking, but also to explain and defend it in the language of philosophical analysis. In order to demonstrate that, as Husserl used to say, our "world of natural attitude" is multicategorical, and that it has an axiological dimension — irreducible to physical one — Czeżowski resorted to the logical analysis of language which we employ to refer to the world. His analysis concerned the functions of some predicates and operators in such sentences as, for example, the sentence:

"The blue sky is beautiful."

But the sentence "The blue sky is beautiful" is equivalent to the sentence:

"It is beautiful that the sky is blue."

Or to the sentence:

"It is beautiful that for some x : (x is sky) and (x is blue)."

However, it is not possible to interpret the sentence "The sky is blue" in the same way because the linguistic construction "It is blue that ..." cannot result in any sentence (Czeżowski 1965, p. 38). More generally, we say that the sentence

" a exists."

should be translated into the sentence:

“It is true that some x is a .”

or into:

“There is such x that x is a .”

Czeżowski in a synthetic way describes the real function and nature of axiological predicates (among others) as follows:

In all these examples there occurs a sentence composed of *modus* and *dictum* (if we use classical terminology); *modus* is an expression “It is necessary that ...,” “It is true that ...” etc., *dictum* is the sentence following *modus*. We call today *modus* a sentential functor. The circumstance that modal functors (necessary, possible), the functor of assertion (it is true that ...) and the functor of evaluation (good, beautiful) do require as their complement a sentence (and not a name, as other adjectives do when they play the role of an attribute) shows that these *modi* cannot be given in presentations but that they are asserted in propositions. Anyway, it has been well known for a long time — Hume and Kant were conscious of it — that they (*modi*) cannot be given in any presentation, and even that these expressions are “contentless”; they express solely someone’s reaction to a certain state of affairs. (Czeżowski 1965, p. 69)

According to these considerations the sentence

“ a is valuable.”

means

“It is valuable that a exists.”

And the last sentence means the same as the sentence

“It is valuable that for some x : x is a .”

Thus, Czeżowski’s view is that “exists,” “valuable,” “good,” “beautiful” but also “necessary” and “possible” are no predicates (neither first, nor second level, nor real, nor formal or logical predicates), and, therefore, they do not express any properties. However, sentences containing them are not necessarily false because they assert that what was called in the Middle Ages “ways of being” (*modi essendi*). (Łukasiewicz 2008, pp. 64-65)

Perhaps what was said above about Czeżowski’s understanding of perception and language might suggest that his philosophy is free from any fantological traces. But this is not the whole story yet.

Fantological elements in the Czeżowski philosophy are best detectable in his classification of metaphysics. This classification concerns contemporary metaphysics: the intuitionist metaphysics, the inductive metaphysics and the axiomatic metaphysics. The intuitionist metaphysics is constructed with the aid of extrasensorial experiences (phenomenological, axiological or existentialist intuition concerning the aspects of the world inaccessible to sensorial perceptions). At first, he was skeptical with regard to the intuitionist metaphysics, (its contents and results are not verifiable (Czeżowski 1948)) subsequently, however, he accepted it. Perhaps, the logical analysis of language convinced him that the world can be described not only in the language of names (individuals) and predicates (properties), but also in the language of "transcendental operators" (*modi essendi*). (Czeżowski 1965) The intuitionist metaphysics supplies us with experience different than usual sensorial perception, and, possibly, makes accessible to us the domain of values, that is, the domain articulated by means of some transcendental operators. The inductive metaphysics is a completion of empirical sciences: it generalizes empirical laws over and beyond the world accessible currently to the sensorial perception (the world beyond the scope of perception is too far in space and time because it is too big or too small for us to perceive it in any possible way). The axiomatic metaphysics is an interpretation of logic; the formal structure and nature of the world is determined by the language of logical calculus which is the formal basis of interpretation.²⁶

As we noted above, Czeżowski in the latter part of his philosophical activity treated all three types of metaphysics as theoretically equal and important. And I believe that is the reason why his philosophy is not free from fantological components. Since, if axiomatic metaphysics is to be theoretically equal with intuitionist metaphysics, then the basis for formal ontology is mathematical logic (Frege's and Russell's invention), and the world (the common sense world included) is only the field of interpretation (the model) for logic.²⁷ In other words, it is the ontologically interpreted logic which determines which worlds are possible, and the last circumstance is fundamental for my interpretation of Czeżowski's philosophy.²⁸ Intuitive cognitive acts (perceptions of various kinds) reveal that the common sense world, i.e. the world of culture and values, is holistic (mereological), valuable and meaningful, and the axiomatic metaphysics provide us with possible schemata of the world and the world of mathematical logic is atomistic, set-theoretical and axiologically neutral.

Thus, the role played by the axiomatic metaphysics in Czeżowski's philosophy is the reason why linguistic Kantianism (as Barry Smith called it) whose formal basis is predicate logic becomes an essential element of, in principle, the anti-Kantian and Brentanian philosophy of Czeżowski.

Conclusions

One may conclude that Czeżowski in principle accepted a phenomenological theory of perception relevant to the common sense world: he defended ontological and epistemological realism. He conceived perception in a broad, multi-categorical sense (there is a correspondence between a type of an object of perception and a relevant kind of perception). Therefore, we are allowed to say that his theory of perception is commonsensical. However, he took mathematical logic as a starting point for building theoretical (metaphysical) schemata of the world. Perceptual data (*Anschauung*) are to be shaped by a universal and conceptual framework of logical calculus, that is logical concepts such as individual, predicate, variable, relation, set, quantifier, functor (in Kantian language: categories of reason). Czeżowski, in fact, treated the content of axiological perception with the aid of syntactic analysis of language expressing the axiological judgments. But, he stressed clearly that the cultural level of our common sense world cannot be treated in the same way as a purely physical and sensorial (natural) level of this world: the natural level of the world is set theoretical and the cultural level is mereological. Czeżowski in this way proposed a dualistic theory of the common sense world: the fantological world of nature and the phenomenological (commonsensical) world of culture. This form of dualism could be removed by conversion of the relation between logic and perception, that is by the rejection of the Kantian model of knowledge according to which perceptual content (*Anschauung*) fulfils logical concepts. On this Kantian view, logical concepts can be regarded as an *a priori* constituent of our scientific knowledge since logic is the very condition of science (Czeżowski's logicism), but Czeżowski's Kantianism is not dogmatic (as it was in the case of Kant himself) because logical concepts and general structures built of them are not universal categories necessarily rooted in the human mind. They are rather products of human logical and metaphysical creativity.

Notes

- 1 The doctrine which we call "fantology" is anti-commonsensical because it claims that the world which is the subject matter of sciences based on the logic of predicates is dependent (it would have been different, if it were not the subject matter of logic) on the language of logic, i.e. it is dependent upon cognitive subjects employing the language of predicate logic (Kantianism) and the content of perceptual knowledge are not things in themselves and their properties, but sets of sense data or a representation of the world (Ayer: *sensibila*). Thus, we are not in direct contact with the world we live in but with its representation, perhaps even, that what we are used to call "world" is only the set of our representations and nothing apart from them

- exists. (Dębowski 2000, p. 169) Fantology implies psychological and metaphysical atomism according to which a cognitive experience is nothing but, say, the set of sense data, and a thing is a set of metaphysical atoms, say, sense qualities. All these issues will be explained below in a more detailed way.
- 2 "Intrinsic to the natural concept of the world is the unshaken belief that all the component parts of my environment exist and develop, change or remain constant, in interaction with one another, in some form of stable regularity, all independently of my observing them or not observing them." (Scanlon 1988, p. 220)
 - 3 It was Brentano and his followers who made this type of philosophy alive again.
 - 4 "Some thinkers, impressed by the success of atomic physics, have concluded that the terrestrial world of surfaces, objects, places, and events is a fiction. They say that only the particles and their fields are real. But these inferences from microphysics to the perception of reality are thoroughly misleading. The world can be analyzed at many levels, from atomic through terrestrial to cosmic. There is physical structure on the scale of millimicrons at one extreme and on the scale of light years another. But surely the appropriate scale for animals is the intermediate one of millimeters to kilometers, and it is appropriate because the world and the animal are them comparable." (Gibson 1966, p. 21)
 - 5 Scientific realism, which claims that the everyday world is such as science tells us and that we are mistaken when we take our world to be as it is given to us in our normal perceptions of it, is also a conception of the common sense world which is anti-commonsensual. It is not necessary, however, that scientific realism is anti-commonsensual; a table in a common sense meaning is one object, and its components are different objects. But, both a table and its physical components can be perceived directly, provided that perception by means of microscope is still a direct experience. (Woleński 2001, p. 80)
 - 6 This opinion about the contemporary French philosophy is not quite adequate. It suffices to study the French contributions to the present book in order to weaken the above presented view of Mulligan, Simons and Smith.
 - 7 But one should keep in mind that the form Fa can be also understood in a nominalistic way: predicate term F is true of or satisfied by certain objects (in our case a). The distinctive feature of fantology is not its ontology of realism or nominalism, but the very fact that ontology is dependent on the language of predicate logic. Thus, the main mistake lies in the way ontology is built.
 - 8 "Fantology sometimes takes the form of a thesis according to which the language of standard predicate logic can serve the formulation of the truths of natural science in a uniquely illuminating way (its syntax mirrors, after all, the very structures in reality which such truths represents)." (Smith 2005, p. 156)
 - 9 Hylton observes that: "the Platonic atomism view of knowledge seems to leave no room for knowledge of a structure or a system, made up of parts but comprehensible only as a whole. On that view of knowledge we can know a and b and know the relation between them, but each of these bits of knowledge is separate." (Hylton 1990, p. 114)
 - 10 Fantology allows for a simple solution of the problem of axiological values: values are natural properties of individuals, or they are reducible to natural properties, or they supervene on individuals and their natural (physical) properties. Thus, fantology can be coherent with perhaps the most popular contemporary theory of values: naturalism.

- 11 Casati and Smith comment this way of representation of the common sense world as follows: "Such translations are an artifice of logic; and they are as far removed from common-sense ontology as they are from representation of common sense reasoning as this exists in actual reality." (Smith, Casati 1994, p. 7)
- 12 However, the necessary condition is the acceptance of the ontology implied by predicate logic. Such a move is not, of course, self evident. Husserl decisively distinguished logic as science about relations among truths and "formal ontology" as science about relations between things. What things are alike and what relations obtain between them does not depend on language structure but on things nature.
- 13 Such a model is sketchily proposed by Smith himself and it is elaborated with the aid of (reformulated) predicate logic. In constructing such a model Smith suggests that, first, one must expand the repertoire of types of entities over which our variables range in such a way that they embrace both particulars and universals in all the six categories distinguished in the Ontological Sextet including: universals (kind, property, process) and particulars (exemplifications of kinds, properties and processes). Second, one should eliminate all predicates of the "F" and "R" style, replacing them with a small number of relational expressions. Smith means here such relations as for example: identity, part-whole relation, exemplification, dependence (individual x depends for its existence on individual y). On this view, the main mistake of fantology does not lie in its being two-category ontology (Smith admits universal properties as well), but in the assumption that "F" in "Fa" stands for something that "would somehow span the border between what is general in reality (universals, properties, essences) and what is logico-linguistic in the realm of meanings (concepts, propositions)." (Smith 2005, pp. 167-168)
- 14 Władysław Tatariewicz makes a very similar description of the common sense world when he says that the world is built of multiplicity of interrelated things. (Tatariewicz 1986, p. 17) The difference between Husserl and Tatariewicz consists in the meaning of "real". For Tatariewicz "real" means "independent". True, it seems trivial that things are essential constituents of the common sense world, but one should keep in mind that both Husserl and Tatariewicz do not claim things to be the only component of the common sense world, contrary to Tadeusz Kotarbiński who defends the view called "reism": there are things only in the world.
- 15 It is not evident at all that Husserl is right as to this point (that soul is a factor animating body). It is a Cartesian dualism, rather odd to common sense. (Smith 1995, p. 407) Perhaps, it would be more accurate to say in this respect that man is a unity of two elements: psychical and material in nature. I think, however, that the safest way is to claim that common sense lacks any clear view as to the nature of man.
- 16 The very fact that some perceptions are hallucinations or illusions is not a sufficient reason to claim that all perceptions are illusive, and that the world is completely different from what we suppose it is like.
- 17 All alarm systems and devices are based on this commonsensical assumption.
- 18 Tadeusz Czeżowski (1889–1981) was one of the closest pupil of Kazimierz Twardowski — the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School — and one of the most eminent, but still less known, representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School.
- 19 Czeżowski is clear that propositional calculus and predicate logic play the most important role in making science and producing scientific knowledge. (Czeżowski 1969, pp. 216-218)

- 20 This is, however, my oversimplification of Czeżowski's views because logical variables are empty places which can also be fulfilled by abstract objects: variables in first order predicate logic can range, for example, over numbers, if predicate logic is interpreted in arithmetic.
- 21 The idea here is that when we think we always think about something.
- 22 Czeżowski in his introduction to philosophy regards *Gestaltpsychologie* as a standard psychological theory, and he ignores, for example, completely behaviorism. (Czeżowski 1959) The main figures of *Gestaltpsychologie* were Wertheimer, Köhler and Koffka.
- 23 Czeżowski himself does not employ such a terminology. He rather speaks about three "attitudes" referred to the world: a human being perceives the world in an attentive way (sensual intention), she evaluates (moral intention) and she contemplates the world (aesthetic intention). Besides, mind is able to grasp universals of various types with the aid of acts irreducible to inductive inferential reasoning (eidetic intention). In this way mind knows concepts and propositions (meanings of linguistic expressions). (Czeżowski 1959)
- 24 The Polish philosopher did not devote separate considerations to ontological studies about the formal structure of the sensorial world, but it is possible to conclude analyzing his scattered remarks about this issue that he allowed in the early stage of his activity both events and processes.
- 25 In his work "On humanities" he argues that the humanistic world is a whole (each element of this world has its own role and significance, and the natural world is set theoretical in nature: elements of this last world compose sets, but the composition of elements is not relevant for them (for what they are). Thus, wholes do not reduce to parts, nor humanities to physics. (Czeżowski 1958)
- 26 If we interpret the propositional calculus, then the world can be regarded as a set of facts (Wittgenstein), and, if we make clear the form of interpreted propositions (say, that they have the subject-predicate structure), then the world will be the set of facts composed of substances and properties. If, propositions are expressed in the language of first-order predicate logic, then the world can be regarded as the set of facts composed of individuals and their various properties (monadic, dyadic, triadic properties and so on).
- 27 Jan Woleński proposes a very simple and clear view as to the mutual relation between intuitionist and inductive metaphysics on the one hand, and axiomatic metaphysics on the other. He writes "The metaphysical interpretation of logic yields a hypothetico-deductive theory which describes the various possible connections among the basic ontological categories. Czeżowski did not explain how such constructions can be confronted with the real world. It seems that he saw the role of axiomatic metaphysics to be that of giving precision to the various possible ontological schemata of the world. If so, then axiomatic metaphysics can co-exist with inductive and intuitionist metaphysics. Hence the interpretation suggests itself that axiomatic metaphysics is an ontology as understood by phenomenologists, i.e it applies to pure possibilities, whereas inductive and intuitionist metaphysics establish which possibility materializes, and thus play the role of metaphysics as interpreted by phenomenologists." (Woleński 1989, p. 73)
- 28 One should add that Czeżowski was perfectly aware of an ontological weakness of first order predicate logic. In his view, one can express important ontological truths only in the language of second order predicate logic. He means for example such truths as the extended law of excluded middle: every object has a certain property

or the extended law of contradiction: it is not true that a certain object has all properties (Czeżowski 1965, pp. 68-69). These ontological truths are theorems of second order logic interpreted ontologically. But let us observe that also in this case the language of logic is the starting point for making ontological claims.

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